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MANAGEMENT LEVERS THAT DRIVE SERVICES CONTRACTING 
SUCCESS 
ABSTRACT 
Contracting for services in the Department of Defense (DoD) has grown over the 
last 21 years. This growth in dollars spent has brought increased political 
attention and scrutiny. DoD has responded to problems such as contract 
mismanagement and ill-defined requirements by improving service acquisitions, 
but it still has problems. The problems could be from a lack of standard definition 
for success. Since contract success and failure is recorded through the Contract 
Past Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) this information is 
used for the proxy definition for success. This definition was used to address the 
following questions: (1) Do the types of services being acquired affect the 
success of a service contract, (2) Do the contractual amounts affect the success 
of a service contract, (3) Does the level of competition used affect the success of 
a service contract, (4) Does the contract type affect the success of a services 
contract. This report examined 715 CPARS entries. The findings revealed that 
contractual amounts and level of competition affect the success of a service 
contract. The findings also revealed that the failure rate in CPARS is lower than 
expected. From these findings, the report presents a discussion of the results 
and managerial implications, and recommends an alternate method in 
completing CPARS data. 
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Historically, the Department of Defense (DoD) has been the single largest 
consumer of  services among government agencies (Government Accountability 
Office [GAO], 2003). In 1990, the Army’s spending alone on services was 
$13 billion and grew to $74 billion by 2010 (Ellman, Livergood, Morrow, & 
Sanders, 2011). From 2000 to 2007, contract-for-service spending remained 
close to a level percentage of total DoD spending until taking a small dip in 2008 
(Ellman et al., 2011). Over the past 21 years, contracting-for-service spending 
has grown in relation to DoD spending on contracting for products, and was the 
fastest growing area for DoD contract spending at a growth rate of 6.1% (Ellman 
et al., 2011; see Figure 1).   
 
Figure 1.  Service Contract Spending (From Ellman et al., 2011) 
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In total spending terms, from 1990 to 2010, with the exception of 2008, the 
Army’s spending on contracts for services has exceeded the amount of spending 
on contracting for products (Ellman et al., 2011). Figure 2 shows how Army 
contracting for services has increased at a much higher rate than Army 
contracting for products during this period. After September 11, 2001, the Army’s 
total contract spending increased at the fastest rate it had been in 21 years 
(Ellman et al., 2011). Spending grew at 139% for services, products, and 
research and development (R&D) (Ellman et al., 2011). After 2008, contracting 
for products decreased significantly while contracting for services has increased. 
This growth in size and scope of the DoD ’s expenditures on services has 
resulted in increased political attention in the last few years. This increased 
political attention has allowed contracting for services to be highlighted and 
scrutinized. 
 
Figure 2.  Army Spending on Products, Services, and R&D 
(From Ellman et al., 2011) 
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Most analysts argue that contracting for services is more complex than 
contracting for products or goods (Church & Schwartz, 2013). This difference in 
complexity is because of vast differences between the two forms of contracting. 
According to Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 37 (2013), a contract for 
a service is a contract in which the contractor performs a recognizable task rather 
than furnishing an end item of supply. Apte, Apte, and Rendon (2010) highlighted 
how services and products contain different characteristics. These characteristics 
include “intangibility of service output, co-production, simultaneity of production 
and consumption, the inability to store services, and the complexity in the 
definition and measurement of services” (Apte, et al., 2010, p. 4). Chairman of 
the Defense Science Board, Jacques Gansler, published a memorandum 
identifying five findings in the board’s assessment of service acquisitions. One of 
the findings was that product acquisition is fundamentally different than the 
acquisition of services. Gansler stated that most current regulations, policies, 
training, standards, education, and management structures are set up to optimize 
product acquisition and only a few focused on the optimization of service 
acquisition (Gansler, 2011).   
These differences have created problems with contracting for services. 
The DoD Office of Inspector General has stated that the DoD ’s contracting for 
services is not managed effectively and that the “current process is 
decentralized, insufficiently rigorous, and unreliable” (GAO, 2003, p. 1). In 
addition, the DoD Inspector General (IG) has issued 142 reports during Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2003 to 2008 that relate to the acquisition and contract administration 
process (Burton, 2009). These reports listed deficiencies that were grouped into 
12 categories ranging from completeness of acquisition support data to material 
internal control weaknesses (Berkheimer, Burton, Ford, Johnson, Jolliffe, 
Mehlman, … Tucker, 2008). In testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Technology and Procurement Policy in 2001, David Cooper, GAO director of 
acquisition and sourcing management, identified several problems with 
contracting for services (Contract Management, 2001). One of the problems was 
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that contracting officials were not using prior experience of services acquisitions 
to help define requirements more clearly. This led to the use of cost 
reimbursement contracts, which placed the government at risk for cost overruns, 
“despite 39 years of past experience purchasing the same services” (Contract 
Management, 2001, p. 6). 
In 2006, David M. Walker, serving at the time as comptroller general of the 
United States, testified before the Subcommittee on Appropriations (DoD 
Acquisitions, 2006). Walker testified that one of the problems identified by GAO 
with services acquisition was oversight of contracts. He testified that out of 90 
service contracts reviewed by GAO to investigate acquisition and contracting 
issues, nearly a third had insufficient contract oversight. His testimony highlighted 
the idea that the contracting office’s priority is to award contracts and not to 
ensure personnel are properly trained to conduct oversight duties (DoD 
Acquisitions, 2006). Without the proper number of trained personnel for contract 
oversight and the use of poor contract arrangements, the government runs the 
risk of not getting the services it requests in a timely manner and of paying more 
than is necessary (GAO, 2013b). In his memorandum, Gansler (2011) also 
identified this weakness in his findings. He stated that the workforce needs 
additional training, guidance, and experience, and that it is inadequately 
prepared to acquire and execute service acquisitions (Gansler, 2011). Because 
of these problems, contract management has been listed on GAO’s High Risk 
Series since 1992 and has allowed 142 reports from the DoD IG on acquisition 
and contract administration deficiencies in five years (GAO, 2013b; Berkheimer 
et al., 2008). 
In response to some of the problems identified, the DoD has made 
advances to improve service acquisition. Some of these changes aligned with 
Gansler’s recommendations, and they are enforced by the Better Buying Power 
(BBP) 2.0 memorandum from the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (USD [AT&L]) Frank Kendall. An example of this 
included the designation of a senior manager for services acquisition in each 
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DoD component (GAO, 2013b). BBP 2.0 also mandated that each component 
adopt a service market segmentation. This forced every component in DoD to 
adopt a standardized approach for categorizing spending on services to assist 
with informed decision-making (GAO, 2013b).   
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Even with the advancements in service acquisitions, there are still 
problems with the way service contracts are managed. These problems could be 
related to the fact that there is not an agreed upon definition of a successful 
service contract across the DoD (Hagan, Spede, & Sutton, 2012). The lack of an 
agreed upon definition of success has made it difficult to measure a service 
contract and has made managing and improving services aquisition increasingly 
difficult.  
C. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to identify variables in the service 
contracting process that promote successful service contracts. The objective of 
this research is to build on the understanding and knowledge that has been 
generated in past research and use this knowledge to advance the acquisition of 
service contracts. This research examines how specific variables affect the 
success of a service contract in order to improve services acquisition 
management in the DoD.   
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS   
The primary question addressed in this research is, what variables drive 
successful service contracts? This research focuses on four research questions 
that explore the variables that result in successful service contracts. The 
variables selected to answer the research questions are the types of service, 
contractual amounts, level of competition, and contract type. This research 
focuses on answering four specific research questions: 
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1.  Do the types of services being acquired affect the success of a 
service contract? 
2.  Do the contractual amounts affect the success of a service 
contract? 
3.  Does the level of competition used affect the success of a service 
contract? 
4.  Does the contract type affect the success of a services contract? 
The answers to these questions determine whether or not a relationship 
exists between these four service contract variables and the success of the 
contracts. This information will prove valuable in identifying variables that ensure 
a successful service contract. The next section will discuss the methodology of 
this research. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This research will be performed by conducting a literature review of the 
service contract management process, the contractor performance assessment 
reporting system (CPARS), stakeholder theory, and previous studies of service 
acquisition management. The DoD CPARS database will be accessed to obtain 
data on service contracts for specific service types. Statistical analysis will be 
conducted on the CPARS data to draw conclusions on how certain variables 
affect the success of service contracts. The next section discusses the benefits 
and limitations of this research. 
F. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS  
The purpose of this research is to identify variables in the service 
contracting process that promote successful service contracts. The benefits of 
this research include building on knowledge gained from previous research on 
service contracting. It will be the first empirical study linking contracting success 
to variables involved in contracting for services. This research will give empirical 
data showing how these variables affect service contracting. The research will 
identify variables that relate to the success of service contracting.  
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While the  purpose of this research is to identify variables in the service 
contracting process that promote successful service contracts, it is not without its 
limitations. The research limitations include the analysis of contracts only 
selected from the Army, contracts only submitted by Mission Installation 
Contracting Commands (MICCs), and contracts only from five MICC offices. The 
second limitation is that only contracts that relate to four selected service types 
were used for the research. The final limitation is the use of CPARS for a proxy 
definition of success and problems that have been identified with the CPARS 
process. 
The first limitation is the use of only Army contracts, only MICC contracts, 
and only contracts from five MICC offices were chosen for the contracts to be 
pulled from and analyzed. This limitation leaves a large area of contracting from 
which data was not gathered and analyzed.  
The second limitation is that only contracts related to four selected service 
types were chosen to be analyzed. These service types were R, J, S, and D.   R-
type contracts are contracts for professional, administrative, and management 
support services. J-type contracts contain maintenance, repair and rebuilding of 
equipment type services. S-type contracts are contracts for utilities and 
housekeeping services. D-type services are for automatic data processing and 
telecommunications services (Apte, Apte, & Rendon, 2012). This limitation 
leaves some services from which data was not gathered and analyzed. 
The final limitation in this research is the use of the CPARS assessment 
as a proxy for contract success, and the problems that have been identified with 
the CPARS process. The use of the CPARS assessment as a proxy for 
contracting success allows for stakeholders to apply their definition of success to 
their contract. This definition may be in conflict with another stakeholder involved 
in the contracting process. This area is covered in more detail in the literature 
review in Chapter II. The final part of this limitation is the problems that have 
been identified with CPARS. This limitation includes agencies not reporting into 
the database at all or not reporting in a timely manner. It also includes the 
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limitations of agencies reporting contract past performance inaccurately into the 
federal database. This limitation is also discussed more thoroughly in Chapter II. 
G. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH 
This report is organized into five chapters. Chapter I contains the 
background information, the problem statement, the purpose of this research, 
research questions, research methodology, benefits and limitations of the report, 
and the scope and organization of this research. Chapter II contains the literature 
review of the service contract management process, the CPARS system, 
stakeholder theory, issues regarding CPARS, and previous studies that have 
been conducted on service contract management. Chapter III provides a 
methodology of how the research was conducted. It describes how the past 
performance information was gathered, categorized, and analyzed. Chapter IV 
reveals the results of the analysis and the implications for DoD service 
acquisition. Finally, Chapter V provides a summary and conclusions, and 
addresses areas for further research.  
H. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the background information, the problem 
statement, the purpose of this research, research questions, research 
methodology, benefits and limitations of the report, and the scope and 
organization of this research. Chapter II contains the literature review of the 
service contract management process, the CPARS system, Stakeholder Theory, 
issues regarding CPARS, and previous studies that have been conducted on 
service contract management.    
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the DoD ’s service 
acquisition process and the current structure for acquiring these services. It 
begins with an examination of the current service acquisition process and the 
responsibilities of the stakeholders involved. Additionally, this chapter provides a 
discussion of how a contractor’s past performance is recorded in the Contractor 
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) for use in future source 
selections and the problems that have been identified with the process. It then 
discusses how success may differ between each stakeholder and the impacts 
that these differences have on service contracts. Finally, the chapter concludes 
with a discussion of related research that has built a foundation for this project 
with a look at six previous studies on services acquisition management in the 
DoD.  
B. SERVICE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
The service contract management process is distinctly different from the 
product contract management process. Apte et al., (2010)  highlighted how 
services and products contain different characteristics. These characteristics 
include “intangibility of service output, co-production, simultaneity of production 
and consumption, the inability to store services, and the complexity in the 
definition and measurement of services” (Apte et al., 2010, p. 4). Because of 
these unique characteristics, services acquisition must follow a unique process. 
The service acquisition process begins with the identification of a service 
requirement that is essential for the organization to fulfill its mission (DoD, 2012). 
The acquisition process includes a planning phase, development phase, and 
execution phase. The process results in a service that is performed in a 
prescribed amount of time and that fulfills the mission requirements (DoD, 2012). 
The service acquisition process consists of seven steps, which are subtasks to 
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the three phases introduced previously and shown in Figure 3: plan, develop, 
and execute (DoD, 2012). Steps 1–3 occur during the planning phase. Steps 4 
and 5 take place during the development phase, and Steps 6 and 7 take place 
during the execution phase (DoD, 2012).  
 
Figure 3.  The Services Acquisition Process (From DoD, 2012)  
The Planning Phase 
The planning phase is the first phase of the service acquisition process 
and consists of Steps 1, 2, and 3 (DoD, 2012). During this phase, the acquisition 
team is formed and receives guidance from their associated leadership. The 
acquisition team reviews current service contracts and the marketplace to create 




Step 1:  Form the Team 
The acquisition team is formed during Step 1 of the service acquisition 
process (DoD, 2012). The purpose of this step is to ensure that the acquisition 
team is formed and that the team is provided the proper resources to see the 
contract to completion. This step is further broken down into six sub-elements, as 
seen in Figure 4 (DoD, 2012).  
 
Figure 4.  Planning Phase (From DoD, 2012)  
These six sub-elements ensure the formation of the acquisition team 
(DoD, 2012). This begins with agency leadership support in acquiring the 
required service. The acquisition team is then officially formed and assigned 
individual responsibilities. The acquisition team consists of Contracting Officer, 
Program Manager, Contracting Officer Representative, Finance Manager, and 
Customer/ End User. The following paragraphs explain the roles of the 
acquisition team members.  
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Contracting Officer 
The FAR defines a contracting officer as an individual with responsibility 
and authority to obligate the government and enter into, administer, terminate, 
and properly close out contracts (FAR, 2.101). Contracting officers pursue the 
interest of the United States by ensuring the proper performance of all contracts 
and enforcing their compliance with the statutory requirements of public policy. A 
contracting officer’s duties are not limited to the solicitation and award of a 
contract. The contracting officer retains contracting officer authority and the 
associated supervisory responsibilities throughout the life cycle of the contract 
(Apte & Rendon, 2007). Some DoD contracting officers are civilian professionals 
serving in 1102 positions. These 1102 civilian employees “include positions that 
manage, supervise, perform, or develop policies and procedures for professional 
work involving the procurement of supplies, services, construction, or research 
and development using formal advertising or negotiation procedures” (Office of 
Personnel Management [OPM], 1983, p. 3). A full description of the duties of the 
contracting officer can be found in FAR 1.602–2. 
Program Manager 
The program manager is responsible for overseeing the acquisition team 
and is primarily responsible for the cost, schedule, and performance of the 
government procurement. Program managers make project decisions and lead 
project execution through effective collaboration. They maintain continuous 
communication through integrated project processes (Apte & Rendon, 2007). The 
program manager understands the need of the agency leads the market research 
effort; and oversees the award, execution, and closeout of the program. Previous 
research indicates that in many service acquisitions, a project manager or project 
team is not assigned and the contracting officer assumes the responsibilities of the 
project manager or project team leader (Apte & Rendon, 2007). 
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Contracting Officer Representative 
The contracting officer representative (COR) is not a contracting-related 
position and does not have the same statutory responsibilities as the contracting 
officer and program manager. The COR is a subject matter expert who uses 
technical expertise to supervise the execution of a contract and provides periodic 
updates to the contracting officer. The AOR acts as the “eyes and ears” of the 
contracting officer and is a vital part of the acquisition team (FAR, 2013, Part 2). 
The COR does not hold a warrant and does not have the authority to award, 
alter, or terminate contracts on behalf of the U.S. government. A detailed 
description of the responsibilities of the COR can be found in FAR 1.604. 
Finance Manager 
The finance manager serves as a financial advisor to the acquisition team. 
Financial managers work to ensure that the acquisition team is operating within 
the constraints of government authorizations and appropriations in order to 
prevent a violation of fiscal law (DoD, 2012). This ensures that the acquisition 
team has appropriated funds available for the contract and complies with the 
purpose, time, and amount for the contract in accordance with statutory 
requirements. 
Customer/End User 
The customer serves as the client to the acquisition team. The customer 
must fully understand the agency’s needs and be able to clearly convey those 
needs to the acquisition team. This understanding allows the acquisition team the 
ability to create a cohesive requirements document (DoD 2012). 
Each of the service contract stakeholders have their individual definition of 
a successful service contract, which often puts them in conflict with each other. 
This is discussed further in the stakeholder theory section. 
With responsibilities allocated, the process begins to move toward 
understanding the stakeholders and the results they desire. During this part of 
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the process, individual stakeholders’ desires are consolidated to ensure that the 
proper services are acquired. After the stakeholders are in agreement with each 
other, the acquisition team develops a plan for communicating with the 
stakeholders and the frequency of that communication. The final parts of this 
step involve the creation of a plan to document the information gathered in 
subsequent steps and to identify training requirement mandates for the 
acquisition team members (DoD, 2012). 
Step 2: Review Current Strategy 
Step 2 of the service acquisition process is to review the current 
acquisition strategy being conducted (DoD, 2012). This process involves 
analyzing the requirements and desired results of current service contracts and 
attempting to draw parallels to the service being acquired. In this step the 
acquisition team attempts to gather all the information necessary to develop a list 
of the exact requirements needed by the service. This step contains 10 sub-
elements, as seen in Figure 5 (DoD, 2012). 
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Figure 5.  Review Current Strategy (From DoD, 2012)  
These 10 sub-elements assist the acquisition team in developing a 
thorough understanding of the service requirements (DoD, 2012). This process 
begins with identifying current service contracts that are similar to the 
requirements. These services are then analyzed to gain a better understanding 
of the service requirements (DoD, 2012). The acquisition team determines the 
risks that require mitigation and documents the information gathered thus far 
(DoD, 2012). The acquisition team also determines whether government 
furnished property (GFP) is used in the current acquisition and determines 
whether it is needed for their service (DoD, 2012). The final steps of this process 
involve an attempt to add a greater level of detail to the desired outcomes and to 
ensure the stakeholders agree with the acquisition team (DoD, 2012). 
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Step 3: Market Research 
“Market research is required by FAR Part 10 and” is essential for the 
successful implementation of a service contract (DoD, 2012, p. 18). This step 
involves gathering price and performance information from the marketplace 
associated with the service (DoD, 2012). A detailed understanding of the 
market assists the acquisition team in acquiring the proper service and avoids 
wasting taxpayers’ dollars. There are seven sub-elements in this step, as shown 
in Figure 6 (DoD, 2012). 
 
Figure 6.  Market Research (From DoD, 2012) 
These seven sub-elements ensure that the acquisition team has a detailed 
understanding of current market practices in the area of the service being 
acquired (DoD, 2012). The process begins with dividing the information needed 
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among the acquisition team members and determining where the team can 
gather that information. The information gathered must be collected in similar 
formats across the acquisition team so that it can be compiled and disseminated 
appropriately. The acquisition team members can begin to contact service 
providers after determining the information that is needed. The gathered 
information is then analyzed and disseminated throughout the team. The final 
step of this process is to document the collected market research, as dictated in 
the FAR (DoD, 2012). 
The Development Phase 
Steps 4 and 5- Requirements Definition and Acquisition Strategy- occur 
during the development phase (DoD, 2012). This phase requires a complete 
understanding of the service objectives and how the service will be funded (DoD, 
2012). During the development phase the acquisition team gathers information 
from the industry in an effort to streamline the acquisition process and avoid 
potential acquisition problems. The final part of this process involves putting all 
the gathered information together to create an acquisition strategy that 
capitalizes on the information gathered in an effort to obtain the correct service 
for the government (DoD, 2012). 
Step 4: Requirements Definition 
Step 4 in the service acquisition process involves compiling the 
information gathered thus far and developing a specific list of all the requirements 
for the service contract (DoD, 2012). This step specifically involves taking a 
detailed look at the individual requirements and understanding how they interact 
with each other. This step is broken into the eight sub-elements shown in Figure 
7 (DoD, 2012). 
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Figure 7.  Requirements Definition (From DoD, 2012) 
These eight sub-elements facilitate a complete understanding of the 
requirements that the service is going to fulfill, along with the associated costs 
(DoD, 2012). The process begins with a detailed understanding of the risks in 
acquiring the service. Most service acquisition projects are analyzed in terms of 
the likelihood of a given risk occurring and its associated severity. This 
information is often compiled on the DoD Risk Analysis Model shown in Figure 8 
(DoD, 2012). Beginning with high-risk areas, risk of contract failure or delay has 
to be identified and mitigated appropriately (DoD, 2012). 
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Figure 8.  Risk Analysis (From DoD, 2012) 
Once the risks are analyzed, the acquisition team begins to create a 
document describing how to fulfill and prioritize the service requirements (DoD, 
2012). One of the tools used to complete this task is the requirements roadmap 
tool shown in Figure 9. The requirements roadmap clearly defines and prioritizes 




Figure 9.  Requirements Roadmap (From DoD, 2012)  
The final steps in this process involve detailing the exact services required 
by the agency or customer and ensuring that the stakeholders agree with the 
estimated costs and the prioritization of the requirements (DoD, 2012). 
Step 5: Acquisition Strategy 
The plan for determining which type of contract to use and how the source 
selection is determined is part of the acquisition strategy (DoD, 2012). This step 
involves putting together all of the previously gathered information and creating a 
plan to achieve the contracting objectives (DoD, 2012). This step is broken down 
into the five sub-elements seen in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10.  Develop an Acquisition Strategy (From DoD, 2012) 
The five sub-elements of the Acquisition Strategy step begin with 
determining the proper contract type to use and ensuring that it contains the 
correct incentives to incentivize the service provider (DoD, 2012). From there, the 
acquisition team determines the method that will be used to select the best value 
source for the service. The acquisition team is assigned responsibilities for 
evaluating the proposals received, and a plan is created to disseminate the 
information amongst the team. The final step involves analyzing whether a draft 
request for proposal (RFP) should be used in order to obtain more feedback from 
the industry; this step is useful in reducing any misunderstandings or confusion 
from the industry and allows for a smoother acquisition process (DoD, 2012). 
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The Execution Phase 
All the planning and development conducted thus far are implemented 
during the execution phase (DoD, 2012). This phase contains Steps 6 and 7 and 
begins with the publishing of a solicitation document. The solicitation document 
officially communicates requirements to the marketplace. From here, offerors 
submit their proposals, which are evaluated on their own merit, and then each 
proposal is evaluated for its ability to meet the requirements listed in the 
solicitation document. Once the contract is awarded, the contractor and the 
government begin to operate as a team as opposed to individual entities. This 
phase could eventually lead to the planning of a follow-on acquisition in the event 
the service is needed in perpetuity (DoD, 2012).  
Step 6: Execute Strategy 
Step 6 marks the official start to the initiation of the service acquisition, 
from the official request of a service to the selection of the provider of that service 
(DoD, 2012). As seen in Figure 11, this step includes seven sub-elements. 
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Figure 11.  Execute the Strategy (From DoD, 2012)  
The seven sub-elements begin with the official release of the RFP (DoD, 
2012) The proposals received from the industry are evaluated based on the 
criteria outlined in the acquisition strategy from Step 5. Once the source selection 
has been determined, the companies that did not win the bid are debriefed. This 
debrief is intended to provide the companies with information that could help 
them be more competitive on future procurements. The final steps in this process 
solidify the quality assurance surveillance plan (QASP; DoD, 2012). 
Step 7: Performance Management 
Step 7 is the final step in the service acquisition process and is essentially 
the implementation of the awarded contract (DoD, 2012). The step involves 
actively managing the contract to achieve the mission requirements. Expectation 
 24 
and contract management are key components of this step. This step is broken 
down into the six sub-elements shown in Figure 12 (DoD, 2012).  
 
Figure 12.  Performance Management (From DoD, 2012) 
The sub-elements in this step begin with measuring the contractor’s 
performance as described in the signed contract (DoD, 2012). The contract is 
administered during this step to ensure that all parties are performing their 
assigned duties, which includes compensating the contractor for providing the 
accepted services. Another important part of contract administration is regularly 
informing the contractor of his or her positive or negative performance of the 
services they are providing. Analyzing and documenting the completed 
acquisition concludes the service acquisition process (DoD, 2012). During this 
final phase of the service acquisition process, the contractor’s performance is 
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documented for use in future source selections. The past performance 
information is captured in a database called the Contractor Performance 
Assessment Reporting System (CPARS), which is discussed in the next section. 
C. THE CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORTING 
SYSTEM 
The FAR defines past performance as “an offeror’s or contractor’s 
performance on active and physically completed contracts” (Part 2). Past 
Performance Information (PPI) is “used to communicate contractor strengths and 
weaknesses to source selection officials and contracting officers” (DoD, 2011, p. 
50). CPARS is used in contracting to capture past performance information (PPI) 
for use in determining contractor responsibility (FAR, 2013, Part 9.104), during 
the source selection process (FAR, 2013, Part 15) and during the contract 
administration process (FAR, 2013, Part 42). This research focuses on the 
source selection process. 
In 1994, Congress viewed past performance to be relevant in source 
selection and included this in the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
(Berkheimer et al., 2008). In 1998, the Navy created the CPARS to collect 
historical information and to be in compliance with the congressional act 
(Berkheimer et al., 2008). In 2004, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, 
technology, and logistics, defense procurement, and acquisition policy 
designated CPARS as the “solution for collecting contractor past performance 
information” (Berkheimer et al., 2008, p. i).   
The Purpose of CPARS 
CPARS was directed by the DoD and is designed to ensure that up-to-
date information was available on a contractor’s past performance, and is 
intended to be used in the source selection process (DoD, 2011). “The CPAR 
assesses a contractor’s performance, both positive and negative, and provides a 
record on a given contract during a specified period of time” (DoD, 2011, p. 1). 
“The CPARS process is designed with a series of checks-and-balances to 
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facilitate the objective and consistent evaluation of contractor performance. Both 
Government and contractor perspectives are captured on the CPAR form” (DoD, 
2011, p. 2).The information contained in CPARS is designed to be objective, 
though subjective data can be used in the event that measurement data is not 
identifiable (DoD, 2011). Once CPARS data is entered, it goes into the Past 
Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS), which collects past 
performance information (DoD, 2012). It is important to note that the information 
contained in PPIRS “is a method of recording contractor performance” and must 
not be the sole information used in determining a source selection (DoD, 2012, p. 
v). CPARS data entry is mandatory for any service contract exceeding 
$1,000,000 and the entries are completed by several different stakeholders. 
CPARS Roles and Responsibilities 
Five individuals are responsible for the overall CPARS input process: the 
activity CPARS focal point, the assessing official representative (AOR), the 
assessing official (AO), the designated contractor representative, and the 
reviewing official (DoD, 2011). The activity CPARS focal point is responsible for 
registering the contract into the CPARS database and is the individual who 
provides CPARS access authorization. The assessing official representative 
(AOR) has the responsibility of assisting the AO as needed, and provides a 
narrative that contains information regarding the quality of the service (DoD, 
2011). AORs are typically CORs who are often assigned from the technical, 
functional, quality assurance, specialty, program management or contracting 
offices or the end users of a service. The assessing official (AO) has the overall 
responsibility of ensuring that the CPARS data and the overall service is 
completed. The AO may be a program manager or the equivalent individual 
responsible for the management of the service acquisition. The AO reviews the 
narrative submitted by the AOR and provides an overall evaluation of the 
contractor’s performance. If any of the contractor’s comments are modified by the 
AO, the AO is responsible for ensuring that the contractor is aware of them prior 
to the CPARS process being closed out (DoD, 2011).  
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The designated contractor representative is the individual who receives 
the completed evaluations from the AO (DoD, 2011). This representative then 
reviews, comments on, and returns the evaluation to the AO. The designated 
contractor representative has the ability to request a reviewing official review if 
deemed necessary. The reviewing official has the authority to provide a narrative 
to the CPARS data and is the individual responsible for signing the CPAR, which 
officially closes out the CPARS process. Once the CPAR is signed, the 
information is available through PPIRS for use by a future source selection team 
for a period of three years. 
The quality of the information in each CPARS data entry is determined by 
the quality of the information provided by the individuals (DoD, 2011). Therefore, 
the effectiveness of CPARS is determined by the individuals who capture the 
data. While the CPAR system has the capacity to capture PPI and provide 
valuable information to acquisition officials, the system requires timely and 
detailed information from many different stakeholders to fulfill its potential. This 
often leads to issues among the stakeholders involved in the service acquisition 
since they all may not have the same objectives in the way they assess the 
contractor’s performance.  
The contracting officer, program manager, COR, contractor, FM, and 
customer all have different objectives in the way each manages a service 
contract. The contracting officer is primarily concerned with a contract’s 
adherence to statutory requirements and public policy, and while required to 
support cost, schedule, and performance objectives the Program Manager is 
held solely accountable for their management (FAR, 2.101; DoD, 2012). The 
COR technical expert would consider a services contract successful if it meets or 
exceeds technical requirements while not necessarily valuing statutory 
requirements or the cost, schedule, and performance of the contract (Apte & 
Rendon, 2007). The contractor values obtaining the highest profit possible while 
satisfying the needs of the customer to obtain future business. The financial 
manager is solely concerned with ensuring that the acquisition team is operating 
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within current appropriations and authorizations. Lastly, the customer is mainly 
concerned with his or her needs being met as expeditiously and efficiently as 
possible. 
Based on the different definitions of success by the stakeholders, it is easy 
to see how the stakeholders are sometimes in conflict with each other. The 
contracting officer may need more time to meet the statutory requirements of a 
contract, which may adversely affect the program manager’s schedule. The 
financial manager may not be able to allocate enough money or even the correct 
appropriation (color of money) to a service to meet the contractor’s required cash 
flow. Lastly, the customer may value a service provided but the service may not 
meet the technical requirements according to the COR. Stakeholder theory helps 
to explain why these different stakeholders have different objectives and how it 
can assist in the management of a service contract. 
D. STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
Stakeholder theory states that in business, the stakeholder’s responsibility 
is to generate as much value as possible for his or her agency or business 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995). The founding father of stakeholder theory, R. 
Edward Freeman, assumed that the purpose of the corporation is to generate 
and dispense some form of wealth to various stakeholders, and that in order to 
achieve that purpose, all of the stakeholders cooperate (Freeman, 1984). 
Applying stakeholder theory to services contracting involves all members of the 
government acquisition team, contractors, and the end user of a certain service. 
The members of the government acquisition team include the contracting officer, 
program manager, contracting officer representative, finance manager, and 
customer or end users. The different stakeholders represented in this model 
have very different ways of measuring success that are often in conflict with each 
other due to their differing goals. When the government and contractor negotiate 
a contract, the terms and conditions represent a compromise aimed at capturing 
the best value for the respective parties. These stakeholders also input 
 29 
qualitative data based on the performance of the contractor into the CPARS 
database, which gives them the opportunity to explain how they measure the 
success of a contract. Even with different stakeholders working together to 
execute a contract, there are still issues with how the process is captured in the 
CPARS database. In addition to the different stakeholders and potential 
conflicting stakeholder goals, there are other issues and challenges involved in 
managing PPI. 
E. CURRENT ISSUES REGARDING CPARS 
The DoD inspector general conducted a study in 2008 on the controls and 
systems in place for contractor past performance records. They found that 
 39% were registered more than a year late from contract award; 
 68% had performance reports that were overdue; and 
 82% of past performance assessment reports reviewed did not 
contain detailed, sufficient narratives to establish that ratings were 
credible and justifiable. (Berkheimer et al., 2008, p. i)  
At the time of this report, the IG found that 321 Army contracts had not 
been registered in CPARS (Berkheimer et al., 2008). These contracts were not 
being reported as required, so there is not any past performance data in the 
system on these contracts (Berkheimer et al., 2008). The report also found that 
82% of the performance assessments lacked detailed narratives to support the 
ratings given to the contractor (Berkheimer et al., 2008).   
The GAO conducted another study in 2013 in response to two previous 
studies in 2009 by the GAO and a 2011 study by the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy (OFPP; GAO, 2013a). In 2009, the GAO found that contract 
reporting systems were not complete, accurate, and (due to limitations) effective 
(GAO, 2009). The OFPP reported that the DoD lacked sufficient narratives to 
justify ratings given to the contractors (GAO, 2013a). In 2013, the GAO found 
that PPIRS compliance for timeliness was up from 56% in 2011 to 74% in 2013. 
This shows that a little over a quarter of the required contracts are not submitted 
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on time into the reporting system. The DoD compliance was shown to be just 
lower than the average compliance of all the services at 73% submitted in time 
(GAO, 2013a). DoD officials attributed the shortcomings of the reporting system 
to the acquisition workforce shortages and high turnovers (GAO, 2013a).   
The GAO and the DoD IG investigations showed that, although the 
systems already in place to evaluate past performance are improving, they are 
still flawed (GAO, 2013a). The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 
FY2012 requires a DoD strategy to ensure past performance assessments are 
complete, timely, and accurate (GAO, 2013a). These studies have shown that 
the DoD still has improvements to make to be compliant with the NDAA. Despite 
the concerns of conflicting stakeholders and the DoD IG and GAO findings, the 
use of CPAR assessments as a surrogate for contracting success is based on 
previous studies of service acquisition, which is discussed in the following 
section.  
F. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
This research is a follow-on to a stream of past research studies on 
services acquisition in the DoD that started in 2006. Apte, Ferrer, Lewis, and 
Rendon (2006) observed that the DoD ’s acquisition volume increased in the 
decade prior to 2006. They began an initial exploratory analysis in order to frame 
the DoD’s service acquisition environment. This research revealed several 
significant findings that impact service contracting. They noted, as mentioned in 
the background section, the large increase in service contracting. They stated 
that service contracting has increased by 66% since 1999 (Apte et al., 2006). In 
2003, the DoD spent $118 billion, which is approximately 57% of the total DoD 
procurement dollars (Apte et al., 2006). They observed that four services made 
up approximately 50% of total DoD spending on services (Apte et al., 2006). 
These services were  
 professional, administrative, and management support services;  
 construction, repair, and maintenance of structure and facilities;  
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 equipment maintenance; and  
 information technology (IT) services (Apte et al., 2006). 
They observed that frequent communication was essential in the success 
of service contracts (Apte et al., 2006).   Apte et al. (2006) discussed a new 
technique called the Business Requirement Advisory Group (BRAG). When used 
successfully, the BRAG facilitates communication in the administration of 
contracts through the contract life cycle. This study brought attention to the 
centralization of service contracts.   It showed the advantages and disadvantages 
of centralization, such as the difficulty of communication if the contract is being 
executed at a different location than where the contracting officer is located. 
According to Apte et al. (2006), the downsizing of the acquisition workforce and 
the push to aggressively comply with Circular A-76 (Office of Management and 
Budget [OMB], 2003) contradict the importance of having the correct number of 
trained acquisition workforce to be successful. This compliance with the Circular 
A-76 causes the value for the money to not be realized. The most significant find 
in this research is that while the DoD has increased service contract spending, 
the management infrastructure has not been maturing like product acquisition 
(Apte et al., 2006). 
In 2007, Apte and Rendon completed their second exploratory research 
project on services. This research looked further into the supply chain 
management of service contracting and the application of a program 
management infrastructure (Apte & Rendon, 2007). Their research identified that 
the traditional approach to managing the service supply chain in the DoD and, 
specifically, the Air Force “does not include a centralized and coordinated 
management” approach (Apte & Rendon, 2007, p. 33). The Air Force’s approach 
does not include a “life cycle, a designated program manager, cross-functional 
teams, or an enabling organizational structure” (Apte &Rendon, 2007, p. 33). 
During their research, Apte and Rendon did observe two types of innovative 
approaches to this structural void to assist the procuring agency in becoming 
more successful. The first approach was the Air Education and Training Center 
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(AETC). The AETC allows for a coordinated pre-award management of services 
acquisition. The AETC “does not maintain an on-site program manager” (Apte & 
Rendon, 2007, p. 33). Not keeping a program manager on site allows for the 
system to potentially fail because of broken communication between the 
interested parties. The ACC (Air Combat Command) model, which uses the 
Acquisition Management and Integration Center (AMIC) approach to service 
contracting, allows for a unique process that provides a cradle-to-grave 
acquisition approach (Apte & Rendon, 2007).   
In their third exploratory research study, conducted in 2008, Apte, Apte, 
and Rendon continued their research into the management of services 
acquisition at military bases throughout the DoD. This research was a survey-
based look at the Air Force and Navy’s techniques for dealing with service 
contracts. This research provided real data on characteristics of service 
contracting, the management approaches used, and the program management 
issues inside the DoD (Apte et al., 2008). 
In Apte, Apte, and Rendon’s (2008) research, the Air Force covered four 
service categories: professional management services, maintenance, data 
processing, and transportation. The researchers looked at the degree of 
competition, contract type, and incentives used. The survey explored the level of 
services that are acquired in the Air Force. The survey also included questions 
asking whether a project team approach was used, who was the leader of the 
team, and who owns the requirements for the acquisition. Apte et al. (2008) 
found that the Air Force services they examined used competition the majority of 
the time. 
The researchers found that the Air Force used firm fixed-price contracts 
the majority of the time, but rarely used incentives, as seen in Table 1 (Apte et 
al., 2008). The data showed that the majority of the service acquisition, 
throughout the life cycle, was conducted at the installation level as opposed to 
the regional level. The research revealed that the contracting officer led the 
project teams as opposed to the program manager. This indicates that there was 
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not program management involvement in the acquisition process of services at 
the installation level (Apte et al., 2008).   
 
Table 1.   Contract Management Approach Found in the Air Force 
(From Apte et al., 2008) 
 
 
Apte et al.’s (2008) research included the following Navy services: 
professional and administrative, maintenance and repair, data processing, and 
utilities and housekeeping (Apte et al., 2008). The survey for the Air Force was 
replicated for the Navy in this research. Apte et al. (2008) covered six regions, 
which encompassed 66 installations (Apte et al., 2008).   
Apte et al. (2008) found that the Navy’s organizational-level handling of 
service contracting was different than the Air Force’s. The Navy acquired a little 
over half of its professional services at the regional level (Apte et al., 2008). Apte 
et al. (2008) found that 68% of the Navy’s data processing services were 
acquired and managed at the regional level. The researchers also found that 
approximately half of the utilities and housekeeping services were acquired at the 
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regional level, and the other half were acquired and managed at the installation 
level (see Table 2; Apte et al., 2008). 
Table 2.   Results From Study of Navy Contracting, Organization Level (From 
Apte et al., 2008) 
 
 
The data shows that the Navy used competition a majority of the time in all 
the four categories of services (Apte et al., 2008). The data also revealed that the 
Air Force contract characteristics were very similar to the Navy’s. The study 
showed that a majority of the time, firm fixed-price contracts were used; however, 
incentives were not used very often (Apte et al., 2008).   
The Navy used a project team approach only half the time when acquiring 
services (Apte et al., 2008). Researchers found that when project teams were 
used, they were only led by project managers half of the time. The research also 
found that when a project team was not used, either the customer or contract 
officer managed the acquisition effort (Apte et al., 2008). 
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This research showed common characteristics between the handling of 
service contracts in the Navy and the Air Force, such as the use of firm fixed-
price contracts, the use of competition, and the minimum use of incentives (Apte 
et al., 2008). The research revealed no standard for managing service contracts 
in the DoD. It showed how the Air Force managed its contracts at the installation 
level, while the Navy conducted most of its management from regional offices. 
The study highlighted the different ways that agencies treat service contracts, 
such as using project teams. The research showed that, even when project 
teams were used, the contracting officer led the teams. This trend has the 
potential to cause problems because the lines of authority become grayer, and 
because team personnel are not working directly for the contracting officer (Apte 
et al., 2008). 
In 2009, Apte, Apte, and Rendon published their fourth study of service 
contracting. This research widened the scope of the survey used in 2008, which 
focused on the Air Force and Navy, to include the Army. This allowed the 
researchers to gain a better understanding of how the agencies in the DoD 
manage their services differently. The 2009 research made use of the same 
survey that was used in Apte et al.’s (2008) third research project with the Navy 
and Air Force. This survey was distributed to eight contracting offices which 
included 40 Army installations. There was a 75% response rate to this survey. 
The services that the research included in this study were professional and 
administrative, maintenance and repair of equipment, data processing and 
telecommunication, medical, maintenance and repair of equipment, utilities and 
housekeeping, and transportation (Apte et al., 2009).   
Apte et al. (2009) showed that the Army used competitively bid, firm fixed-
price contracts without incentives in a majority of the cases (see Table 3). The 
data also showed that the Army conducted a majority of its service acquisition at 
the installation level. This practice may have an impact on the effectiveness of 
the contract given the improved ability to communicate between the interested 
parties (Apte et al., 2009). 
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Table 3.   Army Contracting Results (From Apte et al., 2009) 
 
 
The study revealed that the Army used the project team approach 62% of 
the time (Apte et al., 2009). The respondents said, however, that even when a 
project team approach was used, the contracting officer led the team 61% of the 
time (see Table 4). As mentioned in the 2008 Apte et al. research, this situation 
could cause communication problems and the graying of authoritative lines 
because the contracting officer does not have real authority over most project 
team members. Another finding of Apte et al. (2009) was related to the use of the 
life-cycle approach; this approach was used 40% of the time for routine services. 
For non-routine services, the life-cycle approach was only used 21% of the time. 
The use of the life-cycle approach should be used to ensure proper 
management. If services are non-routine in nature, this approach will allow for 
higher levels of uncertainty. This uncertainty and increased risk will be 
compounded when it is not mitigated through the use of the life-cycle approach 
(Apte et al., 2009).   
This research also found that most acquisition professionals disagreed 
that their organizations had sufficient positions and that the available positions 
were adequately filled (Apte et al., 2009). The data also showed that only 39% of 
the respondents believed the acquisition workforce was trained, and only 45% 
believed the workforce was adequately trained (Apte et al., 2009).   
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Table 4.   Use of Project Team (From Apte et al., 2009) 
 
 
In 2010, Apte, Apte, and Rendon completed their fifth research project. 
This project analyzed the data that was collected in their previous studies 
involving the Air Force, Navy, and Army to gain a better understanding of how 
service acquisition was being managed across the DoD (Apte et al., 2010).  
This research first examined contract characteristics for the three 
agencies. The year 2007 was the focus for the research because that year was a 
common time period of data collected for all three agencies (Apte et al., 2010).   
As seen in Figure 13 and discussed in earlier reports, full and open competition 
was used a majority of the time. 
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Figure 13.  Contract Characteristics Between Army, Navy, and Air Force 
(From Apte et al., 2010) 
Apte et al. (2010) reviewed the previous data and compared the agencies. 
The researchers also gave recommendations to improve the systems in place. 
One such recommendation was for the Navy to adopt a more disciplined 
approach and to look at using a possible virtual project team, since the 
acquisitions and management mainly occur at the regional level (Apte et al., 
2010). If this were implemented, the quality assurance evaluator (QAE) or 
contracting officer representative (COR) can serve as the site manager, and 
issues and communication can improve between the sites of the services and 
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where the contract is officially being managed (Apte et al., 2010). A 
recommendation for the Army and Air Force was to look at establishing an 
installation project manager who is overall in charge of cost, schedule, and 
performance for services on the installation. Apte et al.  (2010) recommended for 
all of the agencies to increase the effectiveness of all acquisition training to 
ensure a qualified workforce. 
Apte, Apte, and Rendon completed their sixth study in 2012 on service 
acquisitions. This research focused on the drivers of management practices in 
the Army. From the previous research they conducted, they believed that four 
factors had major impacts on service contracting (Apte et al., 2012). These 
factors are the 
 Type and quantity of services being outsourced and the associated 
acquisition related workload. 
 Characteristics of contracts being awarded. 
 Capacity available to carry out the contracting, project management, and 
surveillance work. 
 Various management practices, such as use of project team or life cycle 
approaches. (Apte et al., 2012, p. 6) 
The relationship is shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14.  Contract Relationships (From Apte et al., 2012)  
Contract file reviews and interviews at Mission and Installation Contracting 
Commands (MICCs) were conducted to complete this research (Apte et al., 
2012).  
This research focused on four product service codes (PSCs):   
 R—Professional, Administrative, and Management Support 
Services; 
 J—Maintenance, Repair, and Rebuilding of Equipment Services; 
 S—Utilities and Housekeeping Services; and 
 D—Automatic Data Processing and Telecommunications Services  
(Apte et al., 2012, p. 10). 
These PSCs account for 60% of the Army’s spending on services (Apte et al., 
2012). The research focused on contract characteristics and management 
practices (Apte et al., 2012). These two areas include the following: 
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 Contract characteristics: level of competition, contract type, 
award/incentive fee, contract cost, number of modifications, award 
basis 
 Management Practices: use of Independent Government Estimate 
(IGE), number of personnel assigned, use of a team approach, 
acquisition leadership, contract award time, acquisition plan, 
performance work statement or statement of work (PWS/SOW), 
price analysis, price negotiation memorandum, quality assurance 
plan, closeout letter. (Apte et al., 2012, p. 10) 
Their research showed some relationships between service type and three 
contracting characteristics and a statistical relationship between service type and 
five management practices (Apte et al., 2012). These relationships are shown in 
Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15.  Relationship Between Service Type, Contract Characteristics, and 
Management Practices (From Apte et al., 2012) 
Apte et al. (2012) found during this project that the average cost to S 
PSCs was higher than for the other three service codes. They noted that service 
codes R and S had a higher number of modifications than D and J. They found 
that R and S used best value trade-off contracts a majority of the time, while D 
and J used lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) 50% of the time. They 
observed that firm fixed-price contracts were always used, but only once with 
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incentives. They also did not find any relationship with the solicitation process 
and service type (Apte et al., 2012).   
After evaluating the 14 management practices, the researchers found five 
management practices which had a statistical relationship with the service type 
(Apte et al., 2012). They also found that if the contract was over the simplified 
acquisition threshold, the contracts only had IGEs 32% of the time. Apte et al. 
(2012) found that the number of people assigned to PSCs R and S were higher 
than for the other service codes. Apte et al. documented that the contracting 
officer led the acquisitions of the services in 146 out of the 154 contracts that 
they researched, and the contracting specialist led acquisitions for the other eight 
contracts. The researchers also stated that only 43% of the contracts they 
reviewed had a QASP (Apte et al., 2012). 
While investigating whether the MICC’s capacity to conduct acquisition 
work affects its management practices, Apte et al. (2012) found that there is a 
statistical relationship between capacity and management practices. They found 
that the offices did not have the required number of authorized people to conduct 
acquisition functions. They also found that MICC personnel lacked the proper 
training certifications (see Table 5).  
 




The researchers found that the MICCs have a substantial workload with 
minimal personnel, training, and experience (Apte et al., 2012). 
In 2012, Hagan, Spede, and Sutton conducted research on how the Navy 
stakeholders determined and defined success in service contracting. After 
surveying 168 key stakeholders, Hagen et al. found that all the stakeholders 
tended to use outcome related factors as opposed to process related factors 
when asked to define and measure the success of service contracts. They 
recommended that Navy service contract success should be defined in terms of 
both the outcomes and processes. Outcome success was defined and measured 
in terms of the cost, schedule, and performance of successful service contracts. 
Cost outcomes referenced cost overruns, total profits, cost reasonableness, and 
cost fairness. Schedule related to the ability to meet assigned timelines and 
complete the contract. Performance dealt with stakeholder satisfaction and the 
ability to perform the statement of work (Hagan et al., 2012). 
Process success was defined in terms of how the contract was 
administered and planned and the number of protests it received for the definition 
of success (Hagan et al., 2012). The measurement of process success was 
determined by the communication between stakeholders and the number of 
modifications the contract received. Administration dealt with the total workload 
on the acquisition team and the number of contracts the contracting officer 
currently managed. Planning was related to the ability of a contracting officer to 
turn requirements into contractual obligations. Number of protests and number of 
modifications were the quantitative numbers associated with each. 
Communication assessed the amount of information flow and the quality of 
communication between the stakeholders. A diagram of Hagan et al.’s (2012) 
research questions is shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16.  Diagram of Survey Questions (From Hagan et al., 2012) 
Therefore, based on the already mentioned previous studies, this research 
uses the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) data 
results as a surrogate definition of a successful service contract, considering no 
definitive definition has been established by the DoD, and the CPARS captures 
the outcomes for both defining and measuring a successful service contract by 
Hagan, Spede and Sutton (Hagan et al., 2012). 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter contains a review of the available literature on DoD service 
contracting processes. This chapter presented an overview of the service 
contract management process by providing an in-depth description of the seven 
steps and associated sub-elements. The review of the CPARS database in this 
chapter looked at the information that CPARS provides to the user and who is 
responsible for capturing CPARS data throughout the service contract 
management process. Next, the chapter described how stakeholder theory 
explains how the differing goals of the different stakeholders can lead to a 
contract that provides the best value to all parties. The current issues facing 
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CPARS were also described to highlight some of the current problems the 
system is facing. Previous studies relating to service acquisitions were also 
explained to provide context for why CPAR assessments can be used as a 
surrogate for contract success. The next chapter examines the research 
questions for this project and provides a description of how the research will be 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how this research is conducted 
and how a successful service contract is defined using the CPARS data. This 
chapter begins by discussing why the CPARS database is used in deriving a 
definition of a successful service contract. It then expounds upon what data is 
retrieved from the CPARS database and how that data is analyzed. The results 
of the research are revealed in Chapter IV. 
B. DEFINING A SUCCESSFUL SERVICE CONTRACT 
CPARS data will be used as a surrogate definition of a successful service 
contract because it captures the outcomes defined by Hagan, Spede, and Sutton 
for both measuring and defining a service contract (Hagan et al., 2012). Quality, 
schedule and cost control assessments are captured in the CPARS database 
and report key aspects of a contractor’s performance on the contract. The Quality 
rating contains the AO’s assessment of the contractor’s qualitative performance 
and compares it to the requirements stated in the contract. The Schedule rating 
contains an assessment of the contractor’s ability to meet schedules outlined in 
the contract such as “task orders, milestones, delivery schedules, and 
administrative requirements” (DoD, 2011, p. A3–7). The Cost Control rating 
contains an assessment of the contractor’s ability to “forecast, manage, 
and control the costs” associated with conducting their services (DoD, 2011, p. 
A3–7). The Business Relations rating contains an assessment of the contractor’s 
ability to coordinate their business activities such as corporate behavior, 
customer satisfaction, management, and attitude towards customers. The 
Management of Key Personnel rating contains an assessment of the contactors 
ability to maintain qualified individuals in key positions as outlined in the contract. 
The Utilization of Small Business rating contains an assessment of the 
contractors’ ability to integrate small businesses in the execution of the contract. 
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These ratings are completed and approved in the CPARS database. Once the 
CPARS ratings are approved, the information is stored and accessed through the 
PPIRS-RC database. This research obtained the CPARS data by accessing the 
PPIRS-RC database (DoD, 2011). 
C. DESIGNING THE DATABASE 
The search of the PPIRS-RC website was limited to the Army MICC non-
system business sector. From the results of the search, a spreadsheet was 
created of all the contracts contained within the PPIRS-RC database. This 
search yielded 14,395 contracts in total, with periods of performance end dates 
ranging from 1996 through 2013. The data was then narrowed to only those 
contracts containing a Product or Service Code or Federal Service Code 
(PSC/FSC) of R, D, J, or S, which yielded 5,621 contracts. It is important to note 
that construction contracts were not included in this database since they are 
categorized as a distinct business sector within the PPIRS-RC database. The 
data was further narrowed by only searching five contracting organizations. 
These organizations were Fort Eustis (W911S0), Fort Knox (W9124D), Fort 
Hood (W91151), Fort Bragg (W91247), and Fort Sam Houston (W911SE). These 
organizations were selected because they are organized as the MICC Field 
Directorate Offices (FDOs) of five different areas of focus, as seen in Figure 17. 
This narrowed the data to 715 distinct service contracts that were used in 
conducting analysis, as seen in Table 6. For each contract, data was collected on 
the awarded dollar value, basis of award, type of contract, quality of 
product/service rating, schedule rating, cost control rating, business relations 
rating, management of key personnel rating, and utilization of small business 
rating in order to answer the four primary research questions. 
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Figure 17.  Contracting Lines of Operation (From Vollmecke, 2012) 
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Table 6.   Database Breakdown 
 
Total Contracts 
Total Army MICC Non-
System Contracts 14395 
Removed Non R, J, S, D 
Service Contracts 8774 
Total R, J, S, D Service 
Contracts 5621 
Removed other MICC R, J, 
S, D Service Contracts 4906 
MICC FDO Eustis, Knox, 
Hood, Bragg, Sam 
Houston Service 
Contracts 715 
          Fort Eustis 238 
          Fort Knox 119 
          Fort Hood 114 
          Fort Bragg 55 
          Fort Sam Houston 189 
 
Once the database was established, it was further refined by labeling each 
contract as a success or a failure. Labeling a contract as a failure was 
determined by whether a contract received a marginal or unsatisfactory rating in 
quality of product/service, schedule, cost control, business relations, 
management of key personnel, or utilization of small business rating. Receiving a 
marginal or unsatisfactory rating in any one of these ratings labels the entire 
contract as a failure. Those contracts not determined to be failures were labeled 
as successful service contracts. See appendix A for more details. 
The data obtained from PPIRS-RC was exclusively related to outcome 
successes defined by Hagan, Spede, and Sutton (2012). In addition to the 
PPIRS-RC outcome-related data, organizational data was collected in the areas 
of annual workload in dollars, number of actions completed by the MICC, number 
of 1102 billets authorized, and percent of 1102 billets filled. This data was added 
to the database in an effort to analyze some of the process success 
characteristics defined by Hagan, Spede and Sutton (Hagan et al., 2012). Once 
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the database was completed, it was analyzed to answer the four research 
questions. The next section describes how the database is analyzed to answer 
the research questions. 
D. ANALYZING THE DATABASE 
Determination of whether the types of services being acquired affected the 
success of the contract was conducted by determining the total number of 
contracts in each of the R, J, S, and D type services and the total that were 
determined to be failures. The total failures for each type of service were divided 
by the total number of the contracts for that type of service. This result was the 
failure rate for that specific type of service. This analysis revealed whether one 
type of service resulted in a higher failure rating then other types of services. 
These results were then analyzed to determine the stated reasons that the 
contracts were given a marginal or unsatisfactory rating in order to determine 
whether a failure pattern emerged for the types of services being acquired. 
Finally, additional analysis was conducted to attempt to identify other data 
correlations that may highlight why a certain service type was evaluated as a 
failure. These results are useful in determining the management levers that might 
assist in ensuring a successful service contract. 
Determination of whether contractual amounts affected the success of a 
service contract was conducted in the same manner as the types of services 
being acquired. The contract categories in this analysis were broken down into 
five separate categories: 0–$1 million, greater than $1 million–$10 million, 
greater than $10 million–$50 million, greater than $50 million–$1 billion, and 
greater than $1 billion. The failure rates were then determined for each of these 
categories and whether a correlation existed between the ratings that the 
contracts received. Each category then received an in-depth analysis of why it 
received a failure rating by showing which category (quality, schedule, cost 
control, business relations, management of key personnel, and utilization of small 
business) received a marginal or unsatisfactory rating.  
 52 
To answer the third question about whether the level of competition used 
affects the success of a service contract, the contracts were separated into three 
different categories: competitive, non-competitive, and other. Failure rates were 
used for each of these categories to reveal whether the level of competition used 
was related to the failure of that level of competition. The ratings of the 
unsuccessful contracts were then analyzed to determine which area (quality, 
schedule, cost control, business relations, management of key personnel, and 
utilization of small business) was more frequently associated with the contract 
being rated as marginal or unsatisfactory. 
The final research question focused on the type of contract used and the 
success of the contract. This required dividing the contracts into six different 
categories. The first four categories are CPAF, CPFF, CPIF, and FFP. The 
remaining two categories are a combination and other. The combination category 
contains contracts that used a combination of CPAF, CPFF and FFP together 
instead of using just one type. The other category includes all the contracts that 
did not fit into the previous five categories, such as labor hours or time and 
materials. The failure rates and associated reasons determined whether the 
types of contracts being used affected the success of a service contract. 
Once the primary research questions were analyzed, analysis on the 
location, duration, year the contract was completed, and the MICC organizational 
data was used to determine whether any of these additional factors relate to the 
four contract variables. The MICC organizational data focuses on four main 
areas: annual workload in dollars spent, number of completed contracts, number 
of authorized 1102 billets, and the percent of 1102 billets filled. This 
organizational data proved useful in adding some of the process success 
variables defined by Hagan, Spede and Sutton to the analysis (Hagan et al., 
2012). The failure rates and rating patterns among these contracts provided 
additional insight into the four primary research questions.  
Answering these research questions with the data collected reveals 
whether the four contract variables had a statistically significant impact on the 
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success or failure of a service contract. The results of that analysis help focus 
further research to explain why that is the case and what the DoD can do to 
increase the success rate of service contracts. 
Figure 18 illustrates the research methodology previously described. The 
column on the right contains the six CPARS data areas. These areas are used to 
label each contract as a success or a failure based on the ratings (marginal or 
unsatisfactory). The contracts labeled as failures are analyzed using the four 
contract variables shown on the left column. The purpose is to determine if there 
is a relationship between contract variables and contract success. 
 
Figure 18.  Research Methodology 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed the research methodology used in answering the 
four research questions. It began by defining a successful service contract 
according to this research. The chapter then described how the database was 
designed to capture the data that was analyzed. Finally, the chapter discussed 
how the research questions were answered. The next chapter shows the data 
analysis and the results of the research. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reveals the results of the research into “what variables drive 
successful service contracts?” This chapter begins with an overview of the 
database created for this report in order to create a clear picture of how the 
results were derived. This overview includes the total number of successful and 
unsuccessful contracts separated into specific categories. Once the database is 
framed, the chapter explores the four primary research questions driving this 
study, which focus on the failure rates of the different categories. The chapter 
then explores additional information obtained from the database, including the 
MICC organizational data, in order to add additional insight into the four primary 
variables. The additional analysis enhances the understanding of the drivers of 
success and adds valuable insight into what makes service contracts successful. 
This chapter concludes with a significance test and the implications of the 
findings. 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE DATA 
The database consisted of 715 contracts pulled from the PPIRS-RC 
database. These contracts were from five different MICC Regional offices and 
consisted of R (Professional, Administrative, and Management Support 
Services), J (Maintenance, Repair, and Rebuilding of Equipment Services), S 
(Utilities and Housekeeping Services), and D (Automatic Data Processing and 
Telecommunications Services) type of services. The data pulled represent 
population data that meet the criteria of the MICC Regional offices and the 
services previously listed. Labeling a contract as a failure was determined by 
whether a contract received a marginal or unsatisfactory rating in quality of 
product/service, schedule, cost control, business relations, management of key 
personnel, or utilization of small business rating. Receiving a marginal or 
unsatisfactory rating in any one of these ratings labels the entire contract as a 
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failure. Those contracts not determined to be failures were labeled as successful 
service contracts.   
The data consisted of 715 contracts; 22 resulted in a failure label as just 
described and as explained in Chapter III. This resulted in a total contract failure 
rate of 3.08%. These results are clearly seen in Figure 19 and Table 7. 
 
Figure 19.  Total Contracts 
Table 7.   Total Contract Information 
  Failures Success Total 
Failure 
Rate 
Contracts 22 693 715 3.08% 
 
Contracts evaluated and entered in CPARS are evaluated by quality, 
schedule, cost control, business relations, management of key personnel, and 
utilization of small business (discussed in more detail in Chapter III). The total 
contract failures for each area of evaluation can be seen in Figure 20. Each area 
of evaluation was given a score respective of the rating the evaluator gave that 
area (see Table 8). The areas of evaluation scores were then averaged to 
examine what areas where rated higher throughout the population (see Table 9). 
Business relations had the highest average among the other evaluation areas 
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with an average score of 3. Management of key personnel had the next highest 
average with a score of 2.68. Quality, schedule, and utilization of small business 
had equal average scores of 2.5. Cost control had the lowest average score of all 
the areas with a 2.31 average score. 
 
Table 8.   Area of Contract Evaluation Scores 
Rating Score 
Exceptional 5 















Quality 4.19 2.5 
Schedule 4.19 2.5 
Cost Control 4.1 2.31 
Business Relations 4.17 3 
Management of Key Personnel 4.18 2.68 
Utilization of Small Business 4.07 2.5 
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Figure 20.  Stated Reason of Failure Label for All Contracts 
C. ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Research Questions Restated 
The primary question addressed in this research concerns what variables 
drive successful service contracts. This research focuses on four research 
questions that explore the variables that result in successful service contracts. 
These questions are as follows: 
 Do the types of services being acquired affect the success of a 
service contract? 
 Do the contractual amounts affect the success of a service 
contract? 
 Does the level of competition used affect the success of a service 
contract? 
 Does the contract type affect the success of a service contract? 
This information proves valuable in identifying the variables that ensure a 
successful service contract. 
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2. Type of Service 
The first research question is as follows: Do the types of services being 
acquired affect the success of a service contract?  To answer this question, four-
product service codes were examined using data gathered from the PPIRS 
database. Contracts with a product service code of R (Professional, 
Administrative, and Management Support Services), J (Maintenance, Repair, and 
Rebuilding of Equipment Services), S (Utilities and Housekeeping Services), and 
D (Automatic Data Processing and Telecommunications Services) were analyzed 
to include the failure rates of each service contract. The database contained 331 
R-type contracts, 58 J-type contracts, 292 S-type contracts and 34 D-type 
contracts (see Table 8).  
Finding 1: The S-type contracts had the highest failure rate of all the 
product service codes analyzed.   
The 11 labeled failures of S-type contracts resulted in a 3.77% failure rate 
(see Figure 21). There were two reasons that tied for the most common reasons 
for S-type contract failures. These reasons were six business relation failures 
and six failures due to management of key personnel (see Figure 22). R-type 
contracts had nine labeled failing contracts out of 331, giving R-type contracts a 
failure rate of 2.72% (see Figure 21) which was the second lowest. The most 
common reason entered into the PPIRS database was quality. J-type contracts 
consisted of 58 contracts with two labeled failures. This gave the J-type contracts 
a failure rate of 3.45%. For both labeled failures of the J-type contract, 
scheduling was listed as a reason for both of these failures. There were only 34 
of D service code contract types with 0 failures (see Figure 21 and 22). 
Table 10.   Type of Service Acquired Total Successes and Failures 











D 34 0 34 0.00% 
J 56 2 58 3.45% 
R 322 9 331 2.72% 
S 281 11 292 3.77% 
Total 693 22 715 3.08% 
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Figure 21.  Failure Rates of the Different Product Service Code Contracts 
 
Figure 22.  Reasons for Product Service Code Failure 
3. Contractual Amounts  
The second research question is as follows: Do the contractual amounts 
affect the success of a service contract?  To answer this question the research 
grouped the contracts into dollar amounts. The different dollar amount categories 
contracts that were 0–$1 million, contracts greater than $1 million– $10 million, 
 61 
contracts greater than $10 million–$50 million, contracts greater than $50 
million–$1 billion, and contracts greater than $1 billion (see Table 11). The 
researchers looked at these different dollar amounts separately and examined 
the failure rate of each group.   
Finding 2: The contract grouping that consisted of contracts worth a 
dollar amount greater than $50 million–$1 billion had the highest failure 
rate of all the groups in the analysis. 
This group consisted of 92 contracts with eight labeled failures, giving the 
group a failure rate of 8.7% (see Figure 23). This group’s most common reason 
for failing was cost control (see Figure 24). This reason was listed for six failed 
contracts. This failure rate is much higher than the total contract average failure 
rate of 3.08%. In the first group that consisted of contracts that were worth 0–$1 
million, there were a total of 35 contracts. In this first group there was only one 
labeled a failure (see Figure 23). This gave this group a 2.86% failure rate. This 
contract was labeled a failure because of quality (see Figure 24).   The group 
consisting of contracts greater than $1– 50 million was the largest of all the 
grouped dollar amounts. It consisted of 466 contracts, and of those, 10 were 
labeled failures. That gave this group a 2.15% failure rate (see Figure 23). While 
this group had the most failures numerically, it still was under the average failure 
rate because of the amount of contracts total in this group. The most common 
reason for this group to fail, according to PPIRS, was for quality, it was cited 
seven times. The contracts greater than $10 million–$50 million group consisted 
of 118 contracts. There were three labeled failures in this group. This group had 
a 2.54% failure rate. This group was also under the average total contract failure 
rate of 3.08%. This contract group most commonly failed for scheduling issues 
and management of key personnel. It failed for scheduling twice and 
management of key personnel twice (see Figure 24). This means that one of the 
contracts in this group had both issues listed as reasons for failure. The group 
consisting of contracts worth greater than $1 billion was the smallest group in the 
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contractual amount grouping. It consisted of only four contracts and did not 
contain any labeled failures. 
 












$0-$1M 34 1 35 2.86% 
>$1M-$10M 456 10 466 2.15% 
>$10M-$50M 115 3 118 2.54% 
>$50M-$1B 84 8 92 8.70% 
>$1B 4 0 4 0.00% 
Total 693 22 715 3.08% 
 
 
Figure 23.  Failure Rate by Grouped Dollar Value 
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Figure 24.  Reasons for Grouped Dollar Value Failure 
4. Level of Competition  
The third research question is as follows: Does the level of competition affect 
the success of a service contract? To answer this question, the research grouped 
the contracts into three categories: competitive, non-competitive, and other. The 
researchers looked at these different categories separately and examined the failure 
rate of each group. These categories are shown in Table 12. 
Finding 3: Contracts competed competitively had the highest failure 
rate when compared to the other two forms of competition available.  
There were 540 competitive contracts examined in the database. Of these 
540 contracts, 17 were labeled a failure, which yields a failure rate of 3.15%. The 
reasons that most often resulted in a contract failure were in the areas of 
schedule and cost control, which were each referenced seven times. The next 
highest referenced source of failure was management of key personnel, which 
was referenced six times. The failure rates due to level of competition are shown 
in Figure 25. Non-competitive contracts had the next highest failure rate at 
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2.91%. There were 172 non-competitive contracts in the database, of which five 
were labeled failures. Quality was referenced four times while schedule, 
management of key personnel, and business relations were each referenced 
twice. Contracts competed as other had three contracts in the database with zero 
labeled failures. The rating statistics across the levels of competition are shown 
in Figure 26. 
 
Table 12.   Level of Competition Total Successes and Failures 










Basis (Competitive) 523 17 540 3.15% 
Basis (Non-
Competitive) 167 5 172 2.91% 
Basis (Other) 3 0 3 0.00% 
Total 693 22 715 3.08% 
 
Figure 25.  Failure Rates Among Level of Competition 
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Figure 26.  Levels of Competition Stated Reasons for Failure 
5. Contract Type  
The fourth research question is as follows: Does the contract type affect 
the success of a service contract? To answer this question, the researchers 
grouped the contracts into six categories: CPAF, combination, CPFF, CPIF, FFP, 
and other. The researchers looked at each of these categories separately and 
examined the failure rate of each group, as seen in Table 13. 
Finding 4: Contracts structured as a combination contract had the 
highest failure rate when compared to the other five types of available 
contracts.  
There were four combination contracts examined in the database. Of 
these four contracts, two were labeled failures, which yields a failure rate of 
50.0%. Schedule and cost were both referenced twice in the failed contracts 
while quality and management of key personnel were each referenced once. The 
failure rates due to contract type are shown in Figure 27. Cost plus fixed fee 
contracts had the next highest failure rate at 5.56%. There were 36 CPFF 
contracts in the database, of which two were labeled failures. Cost control was 
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referenced twice and schedule was referenced once in the failed contracts. 
Contracts competed as cost plus award fee had 58 contracts in the database 
with three of them labeled as failures. This yielded a failure rate of 5.17%. Two of 
these failed contracts referenced cost control and business relations while one 
referenced the management of key personnel. Firm fixed price contracts had 524 
contracts in the database with 14 of them labeled as failures. This yielded a 
failure rate of 2.68%. Seven of these failed contracts referenced quality while six 
referenced the management of key personnel. Other contract types had 89 
contracts in the database with one labeled as a failure because of quality and 
schedule, which yielded a failure rate of 1.12%. There were four cost plus 
incentive fee contracts, which had zero labeled failures. The rating statistics 
among contract types are shown in Figure 28. 











Type (CPAF) 55 3 58 5.17% 
Type (Combination) 2 2 4 50.00% 
Type (CPFF) 34 2 36 5.56% 
Type (CPIF) 4 0 4 0.00% 
Type (FFP) 510 14 524 2.67% 
Type (Other) 88 1 89 1.12% 




Figure 27.  Contract Type Failure Rate 
 
Figure 28.  Contract Type Stated Reasons for Failure 
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D. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
1. Analysis Overview
The next section shows the results from the additional analysis the PPIRS 
database revealed. It includes the failure rates of the MICCs, duration of 
contracts, and the MICC organizational data. The organizational data includes 
the annual workload, number of actions, number of assigned 1102 billets, and 
the percent of those billets filled.  
2. MICCs
The contracts examined came from the five different MICC regions 
described in Chapter III. The Fort Bragg regional office had 55 contracts, Fort 
Sam Houston had 189 contracts, Fort Knox had 119 contracts, Fort Hood had 
114 contracts, and Fort Eustis had 238 contracts. The MICC regions and their 
associated data are shown in Table 12. 
Finding 5: Contracts completed by Fort Hood had the highest failure 
rate compared to the other four MICC regions.  
There were 114 contracts completed by Fort Hood examined in the 
database. Of these 114 contracts, six were labeled failures. This yields a failure 
rate of 5.26%. The reason that most often resulted in a contract being labeled a 
failure was in the area of quality, which was referenced four times. Schedule and 
business relations were each referenced three times. The failure rates across the 
MICCs are shown in Figure 29. Fort Knox had the next highest failure rate at 
5.04%. There were 119 contracts from Fort Knox in the database, of which six 
were labeled failures. The reason stated for these contracts was most frequently 
in the area of management of key personnel, which was referenced three times. 
Quality, schedule, cost control, and business relations were each referenced 
twice. Fort Sam Houston had 189 contracts in the database with eight of them 
being labeled failures. This yielded a failure rate of 4.23%. The most commonly 
stated reason for a contract being determined a failure at Fort Sam Houston was 
in the area of cost control with five ratings. Schedule was the next most frequent 
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rating that resulted in a failure, which was referenced four times. Fort Bragg had 
a failure rate of 1.82% and included 55 contracts (with one labeled failure). The 
only rating that received a failure label from Fort Bragg was in the area of quality, 
but this result was driven from only one contract. Fort Eustis had the most 
contracts in the database at 238 (with only one labeled failure), but also had the 
lowest failure rate (0.42%) of any of the MICC contracts examined. The rating 
statistics across the MICCs are shown in Figure 30. 










Fort Bragg 54 1 55 1.82% 
Fort Sam Houston 181 8 189 4.23% 
Fort Knox 113 6 119 5.04% 
Fort Hood 108 6 114 5.26% 
Fort Eustis 237 1 238 0.42% 
Total 693 22 715 3.08% 
 
Figure 29.  Failure Rates Among the MICCs 
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Figure 30.  MICCs Stated Reason for Failures Among the Ratings 
3. Duration 
The duration of contracts span from zero to 1,246 days and occurred 
between 2006 and 2013. The days were broken into five different categories 
each containing 90 days. The final category contains contracts lasting over 365 
days in duration. In the first category, zero to 90 days, there were 27 contracts. 
There were 25 contracts lasting between 91 and 180 days. The 181 to 270 
category contained 52 contracts. The 271 to 365 day category contained the 
largest amount of contracts, at 542. There were 69 contracts lasting over 365 
days. These numbers are clearly seen in Table 13. 
Finding 6: Contracts with a duration between 0–90 days had the 
highest failure rate compared to the other four contract durations analyzed.  
There were 27 0–90 day contracts examined in the database. Of these 27 
contracts, two were labeled failures as defined within the parameters of this 
research, which yields a failure rate of 7.41%. Quality, schedule, and cost control 
were each referenced once in the failed contracts. The failure rates because of 
contract duration are shown in Figure 31.  271–365 day contracts had the next 
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highest failure rate at 3.32%. There were 542 271–365 day contracts in the 
database, of which 18 were labeled failures. Quality, cost control, and the 
management of key personnel were each referenced seven times while schedule 
and business relations were each referenced six times in the failed contracts. 
181–270 day contracts had 52 contracts in the database with one labeled failure. 
This yielded a failure rate of 1.92%. The failed contract referenced schedule, 
business relations, and the management of key personnel. Contracts in excess 
of 365 days had 69 contracts in the database with one labeled failure. This 
yielded a failure rate of 1.45%. The failed contract referenced quality and 
schedule. Contracts between 91–180 days had 25 contracts in the database with 
no labeled failures. The rating statistics among contract types are shown in 
Figure 32. 












0–90 25 2 27 7.41% 
91–180 25 0 25 0.00% 
181–270 51 1 52 1.92% 
271–365 524 18 542 3.32% 
>365 68 1 69 1.45% 




Figure 31.  Contract Duration Failure Rates 
 
 
Figure 32.  Contract Duration Stated Reasons for Failure 
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4. Contracts Completed by Year 
The years were categorized based on their completion year, and ranged 
from 2006 to 2013. There were seven contracts in 2006, 18 in 2007, 51 in 2008, 
94 in 2009, 165 in 2010, 175 in 2011, 185 in 2012, and 20 in 2013. These 
numbers are clearly shown in Table 16. 
Finding 7: 2007 had the highest failure rate of all the years analyzed.  
There was one 2007 contract labeled a failure, giving that group a 5.56% 
failure rate (see Figure 33). In 2007 there were 18 contracts listed in PPIRS for 
the services analyzed (see Table 16). This is a small sample, allowing the one 
failure to put it above the average total contract failure rate of 3.08%. The 
contract that failed for this year failed for its business relations and cost control 
(see Figure 34). The first year analyzed was 2006 and consisted of a small data 
group. There were only seven contracts in the data from this year. There were 
not any contracts labeled as failures, giving that group a 0% failure rate (see 
Figure 33). There were 51 contracts listed in PPIRS for the 2008-year group. 
There were two labeled failures for this year, giving 2008 a failure rate of 3.92% 
(see Figure 33). This rate is higher than the total contract average of 3.08%. The 
two failures were given three reasons for their failures (see Figure 34): quality, 
cost control, and business relations. In 2009 there were 94 contracts entered into 
PPIRS. There were five labeled failures, giving 2009 a 5.32% failure rate (see 
Figure 33). The 2009 group’s failure rate was higher than the total contract failure 
rate of 3.08%. The failing contracts for this year listed four reasons for failing. 
The most common reason for failure of these contracts was quality (see Figure 
34). Three other reasons were listed and they were business relations, 
management of key personnel, and utilization of small business. During 2010, 
the number of contracts entered into PPIRS grew to 165 contracts (see Table 
14). There were four contracts labeled as failures, giving the year a 2.42% failure 
rate (see Figure 33). This year was under the total contract average failure rate 
of 3.08%. The most common reasons for failure for 2010 were quality and 
scheduling (see Figure 34). While not the most common reasons for failing, there 
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were three other supporting reasons contracts failed during this year. They were 
cost control, business relations, and management of key personnel. The 
research showed 175 contracts inputted into PPIRS in 2011. During this year 
there were five labeled failures, giving 2011 a failure rate of 2.86% (see Figure 
33).   The year 2011 showed that its failure rate was well below the average total 
contract failure rate of 3.08%. The most common reason for failure in 2011 was 
for scheduling problems (see Figure 34). This reason was listed for all five of the 
failures. There were other reasons for failure, such as quality, cost control, 
business relations, and management of key personnel. In 2012 there were a total 
of 185 contracts, which included four labeled failures, giving 2012 a failure rate of 
2.16%, which is below the total contract average of 3.08% (see Figure 33). The 
most common reason for failure of these contracts was for scheduling (see 
Figure 34). Scheduling failures were listed for two of the contracts. The other 
reasons for failure were quality, cost control, business relations, and 
management of key personnel. During 2013 there were 20 contracts entered into 
PPIRS. There was one labeled a failure, giving 2013 a failure rate of 5% (see 
Figure 33). This failure rate is higher than the total contract average of 3.08%. 
The reason for the failure in 2013 was cost control (see Figure 34).   
 











2006 7 0 7 0.00% 
2007 17 1 18 5.56% 
2008 49 2 51 3.92% 
2009 89 5 94 5.32% 
2010 161 4 165 2.42% 
2011 170 5 175 2.86% 
2012 181 4 185 2.16% 
2013 19 1 20 5.00% 
Total 693 22 715 3.08% 
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Figure 33.  Failure Rate by Year 
 
Figure 34.  Reasons for Failure by Year 
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5. Annual Workload Amount in Dollars 
Regional MICC office annual workload in dollars spent was grouped into 
three categories. The categories consisted of contract totals between $0 and 
$500 million, contracts greater than $500 million to $1 billion, and contracts 
greater than $1 billion. The first category consisted of 344 contracts, the second 
category had 256, and the final category contained 115 contracts. These figures 
are shown in Table 17. 
Finding 8: Regional MICC offices that had spent between $0 and $500 
million in annual workload had the highest failure rate.  
The failure rate for the MICC regions between $0 and $500 million in 
annual workload had failure rate of 4.36%. These rates are shown in Figure 35. 
The primary reason stated for failure was schedule for the 0–$500 million 
category. The second category had 256 with a failure rate of 2.34%. 
Management of key personnel was stated as the reason for failures for category 
two and the final category contained 115 contracts with only one of them being 
labeled a failure, giving the category a 0.87% failure rate. The final category’s 
only labeled failure listed cost control and business relations as the reason for 
failure. These results are shown in Figure 36. 
 












$0-$500M 329 15 344 4.36% 
>$500M-$1B 250 6 256 2.34% 
>$1B 114 1 115 0.87% 
Total 693 22 715 3.08% 
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Figure 35.  Annual Workload in Dollars Failure Rates 
 
Figure 36.  Annual Workload in Dollars Stated Reason for Failures Among the 
Ratings 
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6. Number of Actions Completed 
The number of actions a MICC completed in a year was separated into 
two different categories. The first category ranged from zero to 3,500 contracts. 
The second category ranged from 3,501 to 7,000 contracts. These categories 
can be seen in Table 18. 
Finding 9: Contracts managed by a MICC that completed 3,501–7,000 
contracts annually had the highest failure rate when compared to MICCs 
that completed 3,500 or fewer contracts annually.  
There were 277 contracts in this category in the database. Of these 277 
contracts, nine were labeled as failures, which yields a failure rate of 3.25% (see 
Figure 37). Quality and the management of key personnel were each referenced 
five times in the failed contracts. The failure rates because of number of completed 
contracts annually are shown in Figure 37. Contracts completed in a MICC that 
completed 3500 or fewer contracts annually had the next highest failure rate at 
2.91%. There were 413 of these contracts in the database, of which 12 were 
labeled as failures. Schedule and cost control were each referenced five times 
while quality was referenced four times in the failed contracts. There was no data 
available for 25 contracts, of which one was labeled a failure. The rating statistics 
among contract types are shown in Figure 38. 
 












0–3500 401 12 413 2.91% 
3501–7000 268 9 277 3.25% 
Data not available 24 1 25 4.00% 
Total 693 22 715 3.08% 
 79 
 
Figure 37.  Failure Rates by Number of Completed Contracts Annually 
 
Figure 38.  Number of Completed Contracts Annually Stated Reasons for Failure 
7. Authorized 1102 Billets 
There were 147 contracts that were completed by MICCs that had 
between zero and 50 authorized 1102 billets, 543 contracts that had over 50 
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authorized 1102 billets, and 25 contracts with no data available. These figures 
are shown in Table 19.   
Finding 10: The category with 0–50 1102 billets had the highest 
failure rate.  
This category had 147 total contracts with eight failures, giving it a failure 
rate of 5.44% (see Figure 39). The common reason for these failures was quality. 
This reason was listed for five of the eight-labeled failed contracts. The next 
category that contained 51–105 1102 authorized billets had 543 total contracts. 
This category had 13 failures, giving this group a 2.39% failure rate. The most 
common reason for failure listed for this group was schedule. This reason was 
listed seven times out of the 13 labeled failed contracts. The final group did not 
have data on authorized billets. This group contained 25 total contracts with one 
failure, giving this category a 4% failure rate. 
 











0–50 139 8 147 5.44% 
51–105 530 13 543 2.39% 
Data not available 24 1 25 4.00% 
Total 693 22 715 3.08% 
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Figure 39.  Failure Rates of MICCs by 1102 Billet Authorizations 
 
Figure 40.  Reasons for Failures by Billet Authorization 
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8. Percentage of 1102 Billets Filled 
To analyze how 1102 vacancies affect contract success, the PPIRS 
contract data was broken into six groups. These groups consisted of MICC 
regions that had billets 50–60% filled, 61–70% filled, 71–80% filled, 81–89% 
filled, 90–100% filled, and there was contract data that did not contain adequate 
billet information.   
Finding 11: The group of 1102 billets that were 60–70% filled had the 
highest failure rate among this variable’s categories.  
The 60–70% group had a 4.94% failure rate (see Table 20 and Figure 41). 
The group of 1102 billets that were 61–70% filled had 81 total contracts. The 
most common reasons listed for this group to fail were schedule and cost control 
(see Figure 42). The group of 1102 billets that were 50–60% filled contained data 
for 22 total contracts. This group had one labeled a failure, which gave this group 
a 4.55% failure rate. This rate is higher than the total contract average of 3.08%. 
The reason for the failure in this group was quality, scheduling, and management 
of key personnel. The next group of 1102 billets that were 71%–80% filled 
consisted of 122 total contracts. There were five contracts labeled as failures, 
which gave this group a 4.1% failure rate. This group was higher than the total 
contract failure rate of 3.08%. The most common reasons listed for the failure of 
the contracts were schedule and cost control. The group that contained billets 
filled 81%–89% had 233 contracts with five labeled a failure. The five failures 
gave this group a 2.15% failure rate. This group fell below the total contract 
failure rate of 3.08%. The most common reasons for failure of these contracts 
were quality, schedule, and business relations. The data for the final group that 
had billets 90%–100% filled consisted of 99 total contracts. This group contained 
one labeled a failure, giving this group a failure rate of 1.01%. The group failure 
rate was well below the total contracting failure rate of 3.08%. The reason for the 
failure in this group was management of key personnel.  
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Table 20.   Percentage of 1102 Billets Filled Total Success and Failures 
Percentage of 










50–60% 21 1 22 4.55% 
61–70% 77 4 81 4.94% 
71–80% 117 5 122 4.10% 
81–89% 228 5 233 2.15% 
90–100% 98 1 99 1.01% 
Data not available 152 6 158 0.00% 
Total 693 22 715 3.08% 
 
Figure 41.  Failure Rate for Different 1102 Billet Vacancy Groups 
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Figure 42.  Reasons for Failures of Different 1102 Vacancy Groups 
E. SIGNIFICANCE TESTING 
The research results were analyzed further by seeing if the actual failure 
rates are significantly different than what would be expected if the total contract 
failure rate was applied to each variable. The Chi Square test (Fisher’s exact 
test) was used to test the different variables. The null hypothesis for this test is 
that the category failure rates within the variables are not significantly different 
than the total contract failure rate (3.08%). The null hypothesis is rejected if the 
p-value for the variable is less than 0.05. 
This test showed only three variables that had categories that were 
significantly different when the average total contract failure rate was applied to 
the variable and category (3.08%). These variables were contract amount (p= 
.036), contract type (p =.009), and contracts completed by MICC region (p=.011). 
The biggest reason for a significant finding for contact amount was the category 
of $50 million– $1 billion. If the total contract failure rate were applied to this 
category, it would have expected to fail one time, but in actuality it had eight 
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failures. Within the contract type variable, three contract types had a higher 
difference than what would have been expected. Combination type contracts 
(contracts that used a combination of CPAF, CPFF, and FFP together) was 
expected to have 0.1 failures, but actually had two. FFP type contracts were 
expected to have 16, but had 14. Other type contracts (such as labor hours and 
time and materials) was expected to have three failures, but only had one. The 
final variable that showed a significant difference was contracts by MICC region. 
There were three reasons that showed a significant difference than what was 
expected and the actual failures. Ft. Eustis was expected to have 7.3 failures, but 
only had one. Ft. Knox and Ft. Hood categories were both expected to have 3.5 
failures, but had six failures each. 
 
Table 21.   Chi Square and Fisher’s Exact P-Value Test Results 
Contract Variables p-value Significant? 
Type of Service (RJSD) 0.761 No 
Contractual Amounts 0.036 Yes 
Level of Competition 1.00 No 
Contract Type 0.009 Yes 
MICC 0.011 Yes 
Duration 0.567 No 
End Year 0.619 No 
Annual Workload in Dollars 0.142 No 
Number of Completed Actions 0.709 No 
Number of Authorized 1102 Billets 0.098 No 
Percent of 1102 billets Filled 0.301 No 
 
The remainder of the variables showed a p-value greater than 0.05 (see 
Table 21). This means the null hypothesis is not rejected. While the results of the 
different categories’ failure rates fluctuated, they were not significantly different 
from the total contract failure rate. These fluctuations could be from acceptable 
randomness within the data. The following section discusses the results and 
managerial implications from the research analysis and potential areas the DoD 
can focus on to reduce the failure rates of specific service contracts. 
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F. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
1. Discussion Overview 
The purpose of this research is to identify variables in the service 
contracting process that promote successful service contracts. This section 
examines possible reasons for the results found in the research. It also considers 
each variable the researchers found extraordinary and the categories of these 
variables. Failed contracts are examined by looking at the Service Acquisition 
Process covered in Chapter II, and this section discusses where these failures 
could be addressed to assist government contracting agencies. In discussing the 
implications of the research, it had to be assumed that the contract was proper 
(based on fair and reasonable price and accurately reflecting schedule and 
performance requirements) in terms of the requiring agencies’ needs. This 
allowed proper contract administration to discover deficiencies with the 
contractor’s work and proper documentation into CPARS. 
 Finding 1: The S type contracts had the highest failure rate of 
all the product service codes analyzed.   
The first variable discussed is how the different service types affected the 
success of a contract. It was found that the types of services were not 
significantly different than the overall total contract failure rate. Even though 
contract types are not shown to be statistically significant in terms of affecting 
contract success, it was observed that utilities and housekeeping (S) failed six 
times for business relations and six times for management of key personnel out 
of the 11 reported failures. The business relation’s assessment contains the 
assessment of the contractors’ ability to coordinate their business activities, such 
as their attitude towards customers, customer satisfaction, and their cooperation 
(DoD, 2011).   The business relation’s category could be more closely addressed 
during the Planning Phase of the service acquisition process. Step three of this 
process is Market Research. One possible way of mitigating future failures of this 
type is to ensure that the contracting agency gives this step extra attention. This 
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step contains seven sub-elements that ensure the acquisition team has a 
detailed understanding of current market practices in the area of the service 
being provided. This will assist with making performance requirements more 
attainable for the contractor (DoD, 2012). The next common failure for utilities 
and housekeeping services was the management of key personnel. This 
assessment area measures the contractor’s ability to maintain qualified 
individuals in key positions as outlined in the contract (DoD, 2011). These 
numbers suggest that the contracting agency should focus on the Execution 
Phase of the process and give extra attention to the Execute Strategy step. This 
phase and step goes from the issuance of the RFP to the Post Award 
implementation/transition.   Within this step is the source selection. Prior to 
conducting the source selection process, the acquisition team needs to ensure 
that the source selection evaluators (SSE) are properly trained. The team must 
also ensure that the SSEs understand how to properly evaluate the offeror’s 
management proposal. This proposal gives the offeror’s breakdown of key 
personnel that will be involved in the contract.   
 Finding 2: The contract grouping that consisted of contracts 
worth a dollar amount greater than $50 million– $1 billion had 
the highest failure rate of all the groups in the analysis. 
As discussed in the previous section, this variable proved to have a 
significant impact on service contracting success. The category within this 
variable appearing to be the most significant was the category containing 
contracts greater than $50 million–$1 billion. This group had the highest failure 
rate at 8.7%. The most common reason for this failure was cost control. The cost 
control rating contains an assessment of the contractors’ ability to “forecast, 
manage, and control the cost” associated with conducting their services (DoD, 
2011, p. A3–7). Again, this research assumes that the contractor was provided a 
proper contract, which in turn allowed proper contract administration that resulted 
in an identified cost control failure documented in CPARS. This leads one to 
assume that a contract was awarded to a business that was not able to perform 
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the cost control function sufficiently. This leads back to the Execute Phase and 
Execute Strategy Step needing extra attention to mitigate future failures. The 
acquisition team needs to ensure that all SSEs are properly trained on how to 
accurately evaluate the cost proposals to ensure the business fully understands 
the contract requirements. If the cost proposal is not properly evaluated, a 
contractor may be awarded the contract that does not fully grasp the contract 
requirements leading to future cost overruns. Another category within this data 
was worth analyzing: The group that contained contract dollar amounts greater 
than $1 million–$10 million. While this category’s failure rate was actually one of 
the lowest failure rates (2.15%), the reason for its failure appears to be important 
for analysis. This category had a total of 10 failures. Of these 10 failures, seven 
were listed for quality reasons. The quality assessment factor contains an 
evaluation of the contractor’s qualitative performance and compares it to the 
requirements stated in the contract (DoD, 2011). Since these contract failures 
were proper contracts allowing proper documentation in to CPARS, the 
acquisition team needs to ensure they focus on training of their SSEs. Acquisition 
teams that are a part of contracts within this dollar amount need to focus the 
Execute Phase and Execute Strategy step of the Services Acquisition Process. 
They need to ensure their SSEs are properly trained and can evaluate the 
contractor’s technical proposal. This proposal will help the acquisition team’s 
understanding of the contractor’s plan to complete the quality requirements in the 
contract. 
 Finding 3: Contracts competed competitively had the highest 
failure rate when compared to the other two forms of 
competition available.  
Competitively competed contracts had the highest of the category’s failure 
rates at 3.15%. These contracts most often failed because of quality and 
schedule. While out of 523 contracts only 17 failed, this gave the category a 
slightly higher failure rate than the total contract failure rate of 3.08%. This 
category failed seven times for scheduling reasons and seven times for cost 
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control. The numbers in these two areas suggest the Execute Phase and the 
Execute Strategy step in the Service Acquisition Process needs to be scrutinized. 
The acquisition team needs to ensure proper training of the SSEs on how to 
properly evaluate the contractor’s cost proposal and technical proposal. These 
proposals show sufficient understanding to successfully fulfill the contract’s 
requirements. If the cost proposal is not adequately evaluated, this may result in 
future cost overruns. Inadequate evaluation of the contractor’s technical proposal 
could result in the contractor’s inability to meet scheduling requirements. 
 Finding 4: Contracts structured as a combination contract had 
the highest failure rate when compared to the other five types 
of available contracts. 
The contract type variable was significant on the outcome of the service 
contract. There are three categories worth mentioning in this variable. They are 
the combination, CPAF, and CPIF. The combination contract type showed a 
failure rate of 50%. This could be because of the relatively low number of this 
contract type in the data. The data consisted of only four contracts and two of 
these showed failures. The other two categories (CPAF-5.17%, CPFF- 5.56%) 
showed a failure rate nearly double that of the next lowest category (FFP, 
2.67%). Contracting officers using these types of contract vehicles for their 
procurement of services should be aware of these failure rates. The leading and 
reoccurring theme among all three of these categories was cost control. The cost 
type contracts places more financial responsibility on the government. These 
contract vehicles should be avoided when the requirements of the service allow 
for a FFP contract. To gain better knowledge and build better requirements to 
allow for a FFP contract, Step 2: Review Current Strategy of the Planning Phase 
could help mitigate the use of cost-based contracts. This step involves analyzing 
requirements and desired results of current ongoing service contracts and 
attempts to draw parallels to gather necessary information to develop exact 
requirements needed by the service. Thorough execution of Step 3: Market 
Research in the Planning Phase could also assist with moving away from the use 
of these cost-based contracts and place more cost responsibility on the 
contractor. Market research entails gaining a detailed understanding of what the 
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marketplace associated with the service can provide. This understanding assists 
the acquisition team and avoids wasting taxpayer dollars (DoD, 2012). The 
acquisition team needs to examine the Execute Strategy in the Execute Phase 
and ensure proper training of its SSEs. The cost proposals of these cost 
contracts may not have been evaluated correctly. Without proper evaluation a 
contractor without adequate understanding of the requirements may be awarded 
the contract. This will lead to a greater possibility of cost overruns. 
 Finding 5: Contracts completed by Fort Hood had the highest 
failure rate compared to the other four MICC regions. 
The MICC region variable was examined and was shown to have a 
significant effect on the success of service contracts. There were three reasons 
that showed a significant difference in the expected category failures and the 
actual failures. Ft. Hood and Ft. Knox regional categories both were expected to 
have 3.5 failures but actually had six failures. Ft. Hood had the highest failure 
rates, and at first glance, this finding may appear to be negative. This finding may 
have resulted from the proper use and documentation within the CPARS system, 
thus showing a more realistic outcome of contracting results. This MICC region 
may have more CORs assigned to contracts under their control allowing for 
better oversight and assessing contract failure when appropriate. The most cited 
reason for failure in this region was for quality. Acquisition teams within this 
region may want to examine how the technical proposals are being evaluated in 
the Execution Strategy step. They need to ensure their SSEs are properly trained 
to mitigate future failures for quality reasons. Ft. Knox did not have a pattern for 
reasons of failure. They were fairly evenly distributed and did not show a possible 
weakness in the process to be improved. The next MICC region that appeared 
significant was Ft. Eustis. The Ft. Eustis region fell significantly below the 
expected failure rate. This finding also may be because of manning shortages or 
training deficiencies. This region may not have the CORs to enforce proper 
contract administration and show deficient past performance records through 
CPARS. 
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 Finding 6:  Contracts with a duration between 0–90 days had 
the highest failure rate compared to the other four contact 
durations analyzed. 
As discussed in the previous section, contract duration was found not to 
have any significantly different failure rates than the total contract failure rate. 
The first category of contracts with a duration of 0–90 days had a failure rate of 
7.41%. The small sample size explains this high failure rate. The 271–365 day 
contractual duration had failures for all the reasons listed that was almost evenly 
distributed. The data did not show that duration was meaningful to the success of 
a service contract. 
 Finding 7: 2007 had the highest failure rate of all the years 
analyzed. 
After the significance test was completed on this variable it showed that it 
was not significantly different than the total contract failure rate. While not 
significant, the year 2007 had 18 contracts with one failure, giving it the highest 
failure rate at 5.56%. It failed one time for cost control and business relations. 
This high failure rate appears to be the result of a small sample size. The year 
2011 had a lower failure rate than most of the other years included in the data. 
The data showed 2011 had five failed contracts. All of these failures also had 
schedule listed as a failed evaluation criteria. This criterion is an assessment of 
the ability of the contractor to meet schedules outlined in the contract such as 
“task orders, milestones, schedules, and administrative requirements” (DoD, 
2012, p. A3-7). These failures may have been mitigated through a more thorough 
contracting process such as conducting a more deliberate execution phase. This 
phase consist of the pre-solicitation conference giving the contractor and agency 
requiring the service a more common understanding of expectations and 
requirements (Apte et al., 2006). These findings may also show that in 2011 the 
planning phase and development phase was conducted more thoroughly than in 
previous years, allowing the agencies to better conduct contract administration 
and hold the contractors responsible for scheduling deficiencies and 
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documenting these deficiencies in CPARS. The 2012 and 2013 year groups 
show a decline in scheduling failures, allowing one to assume agencies and 
contractors were able to come to a better common understanding of scheduling 
requirements.   
 Finding 8: Regional MICC offices that had spent between 0 and 
$500 million in annual workload had the highest failure rate. 
Regional MICC offices that did between 0–$500 million in annual workload 
had the highest failure rate at 4.36%. Its most common reasons for failure were 
schedule and quality. To mitigate future failures in the same areas, acquisition 
teams should focus on the Execution Phase and Execution Strategy step within 
the Service Acquisition Process. This step is the source selection for the 
contract. The acquisition team needs to ensure proper training of its SSEs to 
ensure a good evaluation of the technical proposal within the contractor’s offer. 
Without proper training on how to evaluate these proposals, the government is at 
risk of awarding a contract to a contractor that is unable to comply with the 
contract scheduling and quality requirements. While the different annual 
workload failure rates did not show that they were statistically different than the 
total contract failure rate, the numbers did appear to have an overarching pattern. 
As the annual workload increased, the failure rate decreased. The Chi Square 
test shows that these differences could be because of randomness, and how the 
data was gathered for analysis, there does appear to be a trend within this data. 
These findings appear to be counterintuitive to what one might expect. This trend 
could be explained through how the MICCs were staffed. These MICC offices 
may have been projected to have greater dollar amounts passing through their 
regions because of deployments and higher operational tempos in their areas. 
Given this projection, the MICC offices may have been prioritized and manned 
with more personnel. This would allow for more people to conduct the service 
acquisition process more thoroughly and with greater success. This greater 
workload would also allow for a higher learning curve and allow the acquisition 
teams within these regions to better understand their jobs and responsibilities. A 
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counterargument to this could be that these higher workloads do not allow for the 
execution phase to be properly conducted. This allows for less than proper 
contract administration and failed contracts not properly documented on CPARS. 
 Finding 9: Contracts managed by a MICC that completed 
3,501–7,000 contracts annually had the highest failure rate 
when compared to MICC’s that completed 3,500 or fewer 
contracts annually. 
The MICC regions that consisted of contracting actions between 3,501–
7,000 contracts annually had the highest failure rates. This category failed most 
commonly for quality and management of key personnel. These failures in 
CPARS suggest the MICCs that fall within these categories need to look at how 
they are executing their source selection within the execution strategy step. The 
MICCs need to ensure the acquisition teams are properly training their SSEs on 
how to evaluate the contractor’s management and technical proposals. 
Acceptance of a contractor’s proposal without proper understanding of the 
contract requirements raises the risk of contract failure. As discussed previously, 
this variable had p-value greater than 0.05, showing that its categories’ failure 
rates were not significantly different than what would have been expected given 
the total contract failure rate. While not significantly different, the numbers do 
appear to reflect a trend that as the workload increases, the failure rate also 
increases. While the Chi Square test shows that these differences may be from 
randomness within the data population, this trend does allow the researchers to 
speculate. It appears that as the contracting workload increases, the number of 
trained personnel for government contracting is not being adequately increased. 
GAO (2013b) and Gansler (2011) have both identified that without the proper 
trained personnel to conduct the contracting process, the government runs the 
risk of contract failure. As discussed in Chapter I, history has shown dramatic 
increase in service contracting over the past 21 years (Ellman et al., 2011). With 
this increase, it is important to increase the proper workforce as well. 
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 Finding 10: The category with 0–50 1102 billets had the highest 
failure rate. 
MICC regions that had 0–50 1102 billets had the highest failure rate at 
5.44%. Its most common reason for failing was quality. These numbers may 
suggest the acquisition team within these categories need to focus their attention 
on the Execution Phase. Within this phase the teams need to examine how they 
are training their SSEs. These numbers may suggest they are not awarding the 
contract to the best contractor or their requirements for this area are not 
attainable by the contractor. While this variable was shown not to be statistically 
significant, the results of the research did appear to have an obvious trend. This 
data showed as the authorized 1102 billets increased, the failure rate decreased. 
While the Chi Square test p-value states these results may be from randomness, 
it appears to be a result one would expect to find. One can speculate that MICC 
offices with higher authorized 1102 billets also have more 1102 specialists in the 
position, whether all the positions are filled or not. The results of this research 
support the GAO (2013b) and report Gansler (2011) published stating, without 
properly trained personnel to conduct the contract process the government runs 
the risk of contract failure.    
 Finding 11: The group of 1102 billets that were 60–70% filled 
had the highest failure rate among this variable’s categories. 
The 1102 billet percentage category that showed 60–70% filled had the 
highest failure rate at 4.94%. It showed to fail most often because of schedule 
and cost control. These numbers suggest that MICCs within these fill rates need 
to focus on the execution strategy step to mitigate their risk of future failures in 
the same areas. The MICCs need to look at how they are training their SSEs in 
the areas of evaluating the cost and technical proposals. These two proposals 
lay out how the contractor plans to fulfill the contracts requirements in forecasting 
cost and meeting scheduling requirements. These proposals show if the 
contractor really understands the contract requirements. If the contract is 
awarded to a contractor that does not understand the contract requirements the 
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government is at higher risk for cost overruns and schedule delays. This 
variable’s failure rates again proved to be not significantly different than the total 
contract failure rate. The Chi Square test showed that these differences in the 
variables failure rates could be due to randomness or how the data was 
gathered. The results of this analysis had a straightforward trend that is hard to 
ignore. The trend in this analysis showed as the percentage for billets filled 
increased, the failure rate decreased. This trend again supports the GAO (2013b) 
and Gansler (2011) claim of the importance of having trained personnel in the 
positions for proper contracting process phases. Another trend identified in this 
variable was that the cost control failures decreased as the billets are filled to 
more appropriate levels. The direction of these numbers show, as there are less 
trained personnel, the government does run the risk of paying too much and 
higher risk of contract failure. 
G. SUMMARY  
This chapter began by reviewing an overview of the data. This chapter 
then analyzed the data to answer the research questions. The chapter covered 
how the research used the Chi Square test on the data.   This showed if the 
average total contract failure rate was applied across the categories of the 
variables whether there would be a significant difference from what was actually 
captured within the data. The final section in this chapter was a discussion of 
results and managerial implications. This discussed in further detail what was 
found in the analysis of the variables’ failure rates and categories’ reasons for 
failures. Chapter V covers the summary of the research, conclusion of the 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY  
Over the last few decades, services contracting has continued to grow. 
Contracting for services has grown in relation to product contracting over the last 
21 years, and was the fastest growing area for DoD contract spending at a 
growth rate of 6.1% (Ellman et al., 2011). This growth in dollars spent has 
brought increased political attention and scrutiny.   
Contract management has been listed on the GAO’s High Risk Series 
since 1992 (GAO, 2013a). Problems in contract administration have also resulted 
in 142 reports completed by the DoD IG in five years (Burton, 2009). Gansler 
(2011) identified that most current regulations, policies, training, standards, 
education, and management structures re set up to optimize product acquisition, 
and only a few focused on the optimization of service acquisition.  
The DoD has responded to these problems to improve service acquisition 
in several different ways. USD AT&L Frank Kendall released BBP 2.0 to place 
senior leadership to manage service acquisitions. The DoD also forced the 
components to adopt a standardization of taxonomy in order to better classify 
acquisitions (GAO, 2013b).  
With these improvements, service acquisitions still have problems. The 
problems could be from a lack of standard definition for success. With the 
differing goals and objectives of the different stakeholders, a proxy definition of 
success is needed to measure success. Since contract success and failure is 
recorded through CPARS, this information is used for the proxy definition for 
success.   
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B. CONCLUSION 
1. Research Findings 
The purpose of this research was to identify variables in the service 
contracting process that promote successful service contracts. To identify these 
variables, the research was focused on answering these four research questions: 
 Do the types of services being acquired affect the success of a 
service contract? 
 Do the contractual amounts affect the success of a service 
contract? 
 Does the level of competition used affect the success of a service 
contract? 
 Does the contract type affect the success of a services contract? 
In answering the first research question, it was discovered that the types 
of services being acquired is not a significant influencer on the success of a 
service contract (p = .761). The category of S-type services (utilities and 
housekeeping) did have the highest failure rate at 3.77%, and is closely followed 
by J-type services (maintenance, repair, and rebuilding of equipment) at 3.45%, 
R-type services (professional administrative and management support) at 2.72%, 
and D-type services (automatic data processing and telecommunications) at 0%. 
Though the failure rates were different across the service types this research 
examined, the overall failure rate was close to the rate expected for the types of 
services examined in this research. 
In answering the second research question, the data indicated that a 
statistically significant relationship existed between contractual amounts and the 
success of a service contract (p=.036). Contracts ranging from $50 million–$1 
billion had a failure rate over three times higher than the lower dollar categories 
(8.70% vs. 2.86%). It was also found that the single highest point of failure in the 
failing contracts was cost control at six references out of the eight failures. Cost 
control was noted as a source of failure six times, which was twice as often as 
the next most common source of failure which was schedule at three times. 
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In answering the third research question, the data indicated that there was 
not a statistically significant relationship between the level of competition used 
and the success of a service contract (p= 1.00). Competitive and non-competitive 
contracts did have failure rates at 3.15% and 2.91%, respectively. Though the 
failure rates were different between the level of competition used, the overall 
failure rate was close to the rate expected for the types of services examined in 
this research.  
Lastly, in answering the fourth research question, the data indicated that 
there is a statistically significant relationship between the contract type and the 
success of a service contract (p= .009). Contracts that used a combination of 
CPFF, FFP, and CPAF had the highest failure rate in the database at 50%, 
although it must be stated that the sample size of combination contracts was 
over 130 times smaller than the largest population in the same category (FFP- 
522 entries). The stated reason the contracts were labeled as a failure in all of 
the combination contracts was schedule and cost control. The data also shows 
that the Army uses firm fixed price contracts for services over five times more 
often than the next most commonly used contract type. Firm fixed price contracts 
also have the third lowest failure rate, which indicates that firm fixed price 
contracts should continue to be used as often as possible because of their 
historically low failure rate. The results to the research questions can also be 
seen in Table 22. 
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Table 22.   Contract Variables Effect on Success of a Service Contract 
Contract Variables 
Effect on 
success of a 
service contract 
Type of Service (RJSD) No 
Contractual Amounts Yes 
Level of Competition No 
Contract Type Yes 
 
2. Additional Findings 
While compiling the database, several additional variables were analyzed 
which yielded some interesting results regarding variables that influence the 
success of service contracts. These additional variables were failure rates by 
MICC, duration of contracts, contracts by fiscal year, annual contract workload in 
dollars, and the percent fill of authorized 1102 billets by MICC. 
Of all these additional variables analyzed, only the failure rates of the 
contracts completed by MICCs were statistically significant (p = .011). The data 
clearly showed that Ft. Eustis had an overwhelmingly lower failure rate (0.42%) 
for service contracts than the other four MICCs that were analyzed. Ft. Eustis 
had a failure rate over four times lower than the next lowest failure rate (Ft. Bragg 
was 1.82%) and over 12 times lower than the highest failure rate (Ft. Hood was 
5.26%). Additional analysis is needed to determine what caused these failure 
rates to be different among the MICCs.  
3. Recommendations  
Even with the low failure rate, the data showed three statistically 
significant relationships. Contractual amounts, contract types, and MICCs all had 
a p-value of less than 0.05. Contracts valued at $50 million up to $1 billion had 
the highest failure rate at 8.70%. Cost control was referenced six times as the 
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reason a contract was labeled as a failure, which suggests that contracts in this 
category need better procurement planning during the contracting process, as 
discussed in Chapter IV. Contract types that used a combination type contract 
had the largest failure rate of any of the other contract types at 50%. CPIF and 
CPAF also had high failure rates. This suggests that these contracts needed 
better procurement planning and solicitation planning. These two contracting 
phases is where the requirements of the services are examined and contract 
vehicles chosen. The SOW and project scope needs to be developed and 
matured enough to allow for FFP contract to be accepted by the contractor in 
both these areas. This high failure rate also suggests that using a combination 
type contract should be avoided, since it has a high likelihood of failure. Fort 
Eustis had the lowest failure rate of any of the MICCs examined in this research 
at 0.42%; as seen in Chapter IV, this could be because of a lack of trained 
personnel to adequately enforce proper contract administration. This could also 
be from proper manning with adequately trained personnel allowing for adequate 
contract management. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Additional research would be valuable in several areas to further define 
the management levers that drive success in service contracts. The database 
used in this research focused heavily on outcome successes defined by Hagan, 
Spede, and Sutton (2012). As such, expanding this research to include the 
DAWIA training profile, numbers of assigned personnel, and the number of 
CORs the MICCs use would add significant insight to this research. This 
research could also be expanded to include other DoD organizations since the 
contracts analyzed in this report are only Army service contracts. 
Additional research would also be useful in analyzing a larger number of 
contracts that received either an unsatisfactory or marginal rating. Examining all 
the contracts in the PPIRS-RC database that receive a failure label might yield 
useful results when combined with this study. 
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While conducting preparation for this research, a large amount of 
information was found on how government contracting has historically been 
unsuccessful. This, along with the GAO’s placement of contract management on 
the High Risk list since 1992, causes the expectation of a high service contract 
failure rate. This data contained 715 contracts with only 22 total contract failures. 
This set the total contract failure rate at 3.08%. This suggests that additional 
analysis is needed to determine if the CPARS database is accurately capturing 
the performance of a service contract. The results found in this research are all 
based on CPARS entries, which could be biased because of a conflict of interest. 
This conflict of interest is created since whatever rating the Assessing Official 
gives to a contract may be a reflection in the way that person structured or 
managed the contract. This could potentially cause the rating a contractor 
receives to be higher than it should have actually received. The findings in this 
report, combined with a service quality gap analysis, would add valuable insight 
into what makes service contracts successful. The service quality gap analysis 
would reveal the accuracy of the rating a contact received in CPARS, and would 
be useful in determining if CPARS accurately captures a contracts performance. 
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